Kantian Categories as Conditions for Possible Experience and the Objective Use of Understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason in its Second Edition (1787): Metaphysics as a Possible Science
This article analyzes the role played by Kantian categories as a priori conditions of possibility of experience and as the foundation of the objective use of understanding, within the framework of the second edition (1787) of the Critique of Pure Reason. It starts from the hypothesis that the transc...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Humanidades. Instituto de Filosofía
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/ach/article/view/8519 |
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| Sumario: | This article analyzes the role played by Kantian categories as a priori conditions of possibility of experience and as the foundation of the objective use of understanding, within the framework of the second edition (1787) of the Critique of Pure Reason. It starts from the hypothesis that the transcendental deduction of categories aims to enable critical metaphysics as a legitimate science, in the face of the discredit suffered by traditional metaphysics in relation to the empirical sciences. This deduction seeks to overcome both rationalist dogmatism and empiricist skepticism by demonstrating that categories are not derived from experience, but rather make it possible. The analysis is organized around the Kantian method of isolation and integration, which allows us to distinguish the fundamental elements of knowledge: sensibility and understanding. It explains how pure intuitions (space and time) and pure concepts of understanding (categories) cooperate, through figurative synthesis and transcendental imagination, to make objective experience possible. The transcendental unity of apperception is studied in particular as the supreme condition of all cognitive synthesis, the foundation of objectivity. It is emphasized here that this theory is not limited to epistemology, but constitutes a theory of the constitution of phenomenal reality, which is why it can be referred to as critical metaphysics. This implies a revolution in the way of conceiving not only the object of knowledge, which is no longer a thing in itself, but a phenomenon constituted according to the conditions of the subject, but also the subject itself. Kant abandons the substantialist notion of the subject, characteristic of Cartesian rationalism, and redefines it as a formal, non-empirical instance from which all objectivity is made possible. This transformation inaugurates a new way of thinking: it is not simply a matter of knowing what the world is like, but of questioning the conditions under which something can be known as the world. Consequently, the Critique of Pure Reason is not a theory of knowledge in the restricted sense, but a foundational project of critical metaphysics that redefines the notions of object, subject, and experience. From this perspective, Kantian transcendental philosophy allows us to recover the value of metaphysics as a science through a methodological, epistemological, and ontological revolution. |
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