Kantian Categories as Conditions for Possible Experience and the Objective Use of Understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason in its Second Edition (1787): Metaphysics as a Possible Science

This article analyzes the role played by Kantian categories as a priori conditions of possibility of experience and as the foundation of the objective use of understanding, within the framework of the second edition (1787) of the Critique of Pure Reason. It starts from the hypothesis that the transc...

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Autor principal: Favaro, Federico
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Humanidades. Instituto de Filosofía 2025
Materias:
Critical Metaphysics
Possible Science
Revolution
Possible Knowledge
Subject
Metafísica crítica
Ciencia posible
Revolución
Conocimiento posible
Sujeto
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/ach/article/view/8519
Aporte de:
Revistas UNNE - Universidad Nacional del Noroeste (UNNE) de Universidad Nacional del Nordeste
id I48-R154-article-8519
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institution Universidad Nacional del Nordeste
institution_str I-48
repository_str R-154
container_title_str Revistas UNNE - Universidad Nacional del Noroeste (UNNE)
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Critical Metaphysics
Possible Science
Revolution
Possible Knowledge
Subject
Metafísica crítica
Ciencia posible
Revolución
Conocimiento posible
Sujeto
spellingShingle Critical Metaphysics
Possible Science
Revolution
Possible Knowledge
Subject
Metafísica crítica
Ciencia posible
Revolución
Conocimiento posible
Sujeto
Favaro, Federico
Kantian Categories as Conditions for Possible Experience and the Objective Use of Understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason in its Second Edition (1787): Metaphysics as a Possible Science
topic_facet Critical Metaphysics
Possible Science
Revolution
Possible Knowledge
Subject
Metafísica crítica
Ciencia posible
Revolución
Conocimiento posible
Sujeto
author Favaro, Federico
author_facet Favaro, Federico
author_sort Favaro, Federico
title Kantian Categories as Conditions for Possible Experience and the Objective Use of Understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason in its Second Edition (1787): Metaphysics as a Possible Science
title_short Kantian Categories as Conditions for Possible Experience and the Objective Use of Understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason in its Second Edition (1787): Metaphysics as a Possible Science
title_full Kantian Categories as Conditions for Possible Experience and the Objective Use of Understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason in its Second Edition (1787): Metaphysics as a Possible Science
title_fullStr Kantian Categories as Conditions for Possible Experience and the Objective Use of Understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason in its Second Edition (1787): Metaphysics as a Possible Science
title_full_unstemmed Kantian Categories as Conditions for Possible Experience and the Objective Use of Understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason in its Second Edition (1787): Metaphysics as a Possible Science
title_sort kantian categories as conditions for possible experience and the objective use of understanding in the critique of pure reason in its second edition (1787): metaphysics as a possible science
description This article analyzes the role played by Kantian categories as a priori conditions of possibility of experience and as the foundation of the objective use of understanding, within the framework of the second edition (1787) of the Critique of Pure Reason. It starts from the hypothesis that the transcendental deduction of categories aims to enable critical metaphysics as a legitimate science, in the face of the discredit suffered by traditional metaphysics in relation to the empirical sciences. This deduction seeks to overcome both rationalist dogmatism and empiricist skepticism by demonstrating that categories are not derived from experience, but rather make it possible. The analysis is organized around the Kantian method of isolation and integration, which allows us to distinguish the fundamental elements of knowledge: sensibility and understanding. It explains how pure intuitions (space and time) and pure concepts of understanding (categories) cooperate, through figurative synthesis and transcendental imagination, to make objective experience possible. The transcendental unity of apperception is studied in particular as the supreme condition of all cognitive synthesis, the foundation of objectivity. It is emphasized here that this theory is not limited to epistemology, but constitutes a theory of the constitution of phenomenal reality, which is why it can be referred to as critical metaphysics. This implies a revolution in the way of conceiving not only the object of knowledge, which is no longer a thing in itself, but a phenomenon constituted according to the conditions of the subject, but also the subject itself. Kant abandons the substantialist notion of the subject, characteristic of Cartesian rationalism, and redefines it as a formal, non-empirical instance from which all objectivity is made possible. This transformation inaugurates a new way of thinking: it is not simply a matter of knowing what the world is like, but of questioning the conditions under which something can be known as the world. Consequently, the Critique of Pure Reason is not a theory of knowledge in the restricted sense, but a foundational project of critical metaphysics that redefines the notions of object, subject, and experience. From this perspective, Kantian transcendental philosophy allows us to recover the value of metaphysics as a science through a methodological, epistemological, and ontological revolution.
publisher Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Humanidades. Instituto de Filosofía
publishDate 2025
url https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/ach/article/view/8519
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spelling I48-R154-article-85192025-08-28T15:54:57Z Kantian Categories as Conditions for Possible Experience and the Objective Use of Understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason in its Second Edition (1787): Metaphysics as a Possible Science Las categorías kantianas como condiciones para la experiencia posible y el uso objetivo del entendimiento en la Crítica de la Razón Pura en su segunda edición (1787): la metafísica como ciencia posible Favaro, Federico Critical Metaphysics Possible Science Revolution Possible Knowledge Subject Metafísica crítica Ciencia posible Revolución Conocimiento posible Sujeto This article analyzes the role played by Kantian categories as a priori conditions of possibility of experience and as the foundation of the objective use of understanding, within the framework of the second edition (1787) of the Critique of Pure Reason. It starts from the hypothesis that the transcendental deduction of categories aims to enable critical metaphysics as a legitimate science, in the face of the discredit suffered by traditional metaphysics in relation to the empirical sciences. This deduction seeks to overcome both rationalist dogmatism and empiricist skepticism by demonstrating that categories are not derived from experience, but rather make it possible. The analysis is organized around the Kantian method of isolation and integration, which allows us to distinguish the fundamental elements of knowledge: sensibility and understanding. It explains how pure intuitions (space and time) and pure concepts of understanding (categories) cooperate, through figurative synthesis and transcendental imagination, to make objective experience possible. The transcendental unity of apperception is studied in particular as the supreme condition of all cognitive synthesis, the foundation of objectivity. It is emphasized here that this theory is not limited to epistemology, but constitutes a theory of the constitution of phenomenal reality, which is why it can be referred to as critical metaphysics. This implies a revolution in the way of conceiving not only the object of knowledge, which is no longer a thing in itself, but a phenomenon constituted according to the conditions of the subject, but also the subject itself. Kant abandons the substantialist notion of the subject, characteristic of Cartesian rationalism, and redefines it as a formal, non-empirical instance from which all objectivity is made possible. This transformation inaugurates a new way of thinking: it is not simply a matter of knowing what the world is like, but of questioning the conditions under which something can be known as the world. Consequently, the Critique of Pure Reason is not a theory of knowledge in the restricted sense, but a foundational project of critical metaphysics that redefines the notions of object, subject, and experience. From this perspective, Kantian transcendental philosophy allows us to recover the value of metaphysics as a science through a methodological, epistemological, and ontological revolution. Este artículo analiza el papel que cumplen las categorías kantianas como condiciones a priori de posibilidad de la experiencia y como fundamento del uso objetivo del entendimiento, en el marco de la segunda edición (1787) de la Crítica de la Razón Pura. Se parte de la hipótesis de que la deducción trascendental de las categorías tiene por finalidad posibilitar una metafísica crítica como ciencia legítima, frente al descrédito que sufría la metafísica tradicional frente a las ciencias empíricas. Esta deducción busca superar tanto el dogmatismo racionalista como el escepticismo empirista, al demostrar que las categorías no se derivan de la experiencia, sino que la hacen posible. El análisis se organiza en torno al método kantiano de aislamiento e integración, que permite distinguir los elementos fundamentales del conocimiento: la sensibilidad y el entendimiento. Se explica cómo las intuiciones puras (espacio y tiempo) y los conceptos puros del entendimiento (categorías) cooperan, a través de la síntesis figurada y la imaginación trascendental, para posibilitar la experiencia objetiva. Se estudia especialmente la unidad trascendental de la apercepción como condición suprema de toda síntesis cognitiva, fundamento de la objetividad. Se destaca aquí que esta teoría no se limita a una epistemología, sino que constituye una teoría de la constitución de la realidad fenoménica, por lo que puede hablarse de una metafísica crítica. Esto implica una revolución en la manera de concebir no sólo el objeto del conocimiento, que ya no es cosa en sí, sino fenómeno constituido según las condiciones del sujeto, sino también del sujeto mismo. Kant abandona la noción sustancialista de sujeto, propia del racionalismo cartesiano, y lo redefine como una instancia formal, no empírica, desde la cual se posibilita toda objetividad. Esta transformación inaugura una nueva manera de pensar: no se trata simplemente de conocer cómo es el mundo, sino de interrogar las condiciones bajo las cuales algo puede ser conocido como mundo. En consecuencia, la Crítica de la Razón Pura no es una teoría del conocimiento en sentido restringido, sino un proyecto fundacional de una metafísica crítica que redefine las nociones de objeto, sujeto y experiencia. Desde esta perspectiva, la filosofía trascendental kantiana permite recuperar el valor de la metafísica como ciencia, mediante una revolución metodológica, epistemológica y ontológica. Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Humanidades. Instituto de Filosofía 2025-08-28 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Artículo revisado por pares application/pdf https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/ach/article/view/8519 10.30972/ach1020258519 Acheronta; Núm. 10 (2025); 1-21 2344-9934 spa https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/ach/article/view/8519/8144 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0

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