What does it mean to be defeated by pleasures? Hedonism and akrasia in Plato’s Protagoras
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the final argument of Protagoras, where Socrates introduces the question of pleasure and its relation to the good. In order to do so, it is necessary to consider the initial arguments where the question of the teachability of virtue (aretê) and the subsequent...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Instituto de Filosofía - Facultad de Humanidades. UNNE
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/nit/article/view/8420 |
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| Sumario: | The purpose of this paper is to analyze the final argument of Protagoras, where Socrates introduces the question of pleasure and its relation to the good. In order to do so, it is necessary to consider the initial arguments where the question of the teachability of virtue (aretê) and the subsequent attempt to reach a unifying criterion, one which will focus on its sapiential character. This itinerary will allow us to shed light on the Socratic arguments from 351b onwards and the introduction of hedonism, which will enable us to delimit Socrates' position in relation to the problem of akrasia. The knowledge of the virtues –understood as wisdom– will be a necessary condition for right action, and, consequently, whoever is overcome by pleasure in reality ignores what is really best. |
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