What does it mean to be defeated by pleasures? Hedonism and akrasia in Plato’s Protagoras
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the final argument of Protagoras, where Socrates introduces the question of pleasure and its relation to the good. In order to do so, it is necessary to consider the initial arguments where the question of the teachability of virtue (aretê) and the subsequent...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Instituto de Filosofía - Facultad de Humanidades. UNNE
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/nit/article/view/8420 |
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I48-R154-article-8420 |
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I48-R154-article-84202025-07-22T01:35:17Z What does it mean to be defeated by pleasures? Hedonism and akrasia in Plato’s Protagoras ¿Qué significa ser derrotado por los placeres? Hedonismo y akrasia en el Protágoras de Platón Figueroa Crivelli, Juan Pablo pleasure good hedonism virtue Plato placer bien hedonismo virtud Platón The purpose of this paper is to analyze the final argument of Protagoras, where Socrates introduces the question of pleasure and its relation to the good. In order to do so, it is necessary to consider the initial arguments where the question of the teachability of virtue (aretê) and the subsequent attempt to reach a unifying criterion, one which will focus on its sapiential character. This itinerary will allow us to shed light on the Socratic arguments from 351b onwards and the introduction of hedonism, which will enable us to delimit Socrates' position in relation to the problem of akrasia. The knowledge of the virtues –understood as wisdom– will be a necessary condition for right action, and, consequently, whoever is overcome by pleasure in reality ignores what is really best. El propósito de este trabajo es analizar el argumento final del Protágoras, donde Sócrates introduce la cuestión del placer y su relación con el bien. Con este fin, es necesario recoger los argumentos iniciales donde se plantea, en primer lugar, la cuestión de la enseñabilidad de la virtud (aretê) y el posterior intento de alcanzar un criterio unificador de sus diversas manifestaciones, que se centrará en su carácter sapiencial. Este itinerario permitirá arrojar luz sobre los argumentos socráticos a partir de 351b y la introducción del hedonismo, lo cual nos permitirá delimitar la postura de Sócrates en relación con el problema de la akrasia. El conocimiento de las virtudes –entendido como sabiduría– será condición necesaria para el recto obrar, y, en consecuencia, quien es vencido por el placer en realidad ignora lo que en verdad es mejor. Instituto de Filosofía - Facultad de Humanidades. UNNE 2025-07-22 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/nit/article/view/8420 10.30972/nvt.2118420 New Itinerary; Vol. 21 No. 1 (2025); 1-23 Nuevo Itinerario; Vol. 21 Núm. 1 (2025); 1-23 Novo itinerário; v. 21 n. 1 (2025); 1-23 1850-3578 spa https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/nit/article/view/8420/8037 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 |
| institution |
Universidad Nacional del Nordeste |
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I-48 |
| repository_str |
R-154 |
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Revistas UNNE - Universidad Nacional del Noroeste (UNNE) |
| language |
Español |
| format |
Artículo revista |
| topic |
pleasure good hedonism virtue Plato placer bien hedonismo virtud Platón |
| spellingShingle |
pleasure good hedonism virtue Plato placer bien hedonismo virtud Platón Figueroa Crivelli, Juan Pablo What does it mean to be defeated by pleasures? Hedonism and akrasia in Plato’s Protagoras |
| topic_facet |
pleasure good hedonism virtue Plato placer bien hedonismo virtud Platón |
| author |
Figueroa Crivelli, Juan Pablo |
| author_facet |
Figueroa Crivelli, Juan Pablo |
| author_sort |
Figueroa Crivelli, Juan Pablo |
| title |
What does it mean to be defeated by pleasures? Hedonism and akrasia in Plato’s Protagoras |
| title_short |
What does it mean to be defeated by pleasures? Hedonism and akrasia in Plato’s Protagoras |
| title_full |
What does it mean to be defeated by pleasures? Hedonism and akrasia in Plato’s Protagoras |
| title_fullStr |
What does it mean to be defeated by pleasures? Hedonism and akrasia in Plato’s Protagoras |
| title_full_unstemmed |
What does it mean to be defeated by pleasures? Hedonism and akrasia in Plato’s Protagoras |
| title_sort |
what does it mean to be defeated by pleasures? hedonism and akrasia in plato’s protagoras |
| description |
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the final argument of Protagoras, where Socrates introduces the question of pleasure and its relation to the good. In order to do so, it is necessary to consider the initial arguments where the question of the teachability of virtue (aretê) and the subsequent attempt to reach a unifying criterion, one which will focus on its sapiential character. This itinerary will allow us to shed light on the Socratic arguments from 351b onwards and the introduction of hedonism, which will enable us to delimit Socrates' position in relation to the problem of akrasia. The knowledge of the virtues –understood as wisdom– will be a necessary condition for right action, and, consequently, whoever is overcome by pleasure in reality ignores what is really best. |
| publisher |
Instituto de Filosofía - Facultad de Humanidades. UNNE |
| publishDate |
2025 |
| url |
https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/nit/article/view/8420 |
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