Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors

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Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solut...

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Autores principales:	González, P., Rebón, L., Ferreira da Silva, T., Figueroa, M., Saavedra, C., Curty, M., Lima, G., Xavier, G.B., Nogueira, W.A.T.
Formato:	JOUR
Materias:	Hardware security Side channel attack Bridge theories Eavesdropping strategies Legitimate users Low-loss Measurement device Quantum cryptography
Acceso en línea:	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez
Aporte de:	Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires

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spelling	todo:paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez2023-10-03T16:00:23Z Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors González, P. Rebón, L. Ferreira da Silva, T. Figueroa, M. Saavedra, C. Curty, M. Lima, G. Xavier, G.B. Nogueira, W.A.T. Hardware security Side channel attack Bridge theories Eavesdropping strategies Legitimate users Low-loss Measurement device Quantum cryptography Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies. © 2015 American Physical Society. JOUR info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez
institution	Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str	I-28
repository_str	R-134
collection	Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA)
topic	Hardware security Side channel attack Bridge theories Eavesdropping strategies Legitimate users Low-loss Measurement device Quantum cryptography
spellingShingle	Hardware security Side channel attack Bridge theories Eavesdropping strategies Legitimate users Low-loss Measurement device Quantum cryptography González, P. Rebón, L. Ferreira da Silva, T. Figueroa, M. Saavedra, C. Curty, M. Lima, G. Xavier, G.B. Nogueira, W.A.T. Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
topic_facet	Hardware security Side channel attack Bridge theories Eavesdropping strategies Legitimate users Low-loss Measurement device Quantum cryptography
description	Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies. © 2015 American Physical Society.
format	JOUR
author	González, P. Rebón, L. Ferreira da Silva, T. Figueroa, M. Saavedra, C. Curty, M. Lima, G. Xavier, G.B. Nogueira, W.A.T.
author_facet	González, P. Rebón, L. Ferreira da Silva, T. Figueroa, M. Saavedra, C. Curty, M. Lima, G. Xavier, G.B. Nogueira, W.A.T.
author_sort	González, P.
title	Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_short	Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_full	Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_fullStr	Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_full_unstemmed	Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_sort	quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
url	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez
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Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors

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