Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries

According to reputation models of sovereign debt, the incentives to repay are proportional to the income insurance benefits provided by the access to international markets. This paper, however, documents that private net lending to developing countries exhibits a procyclical or acyclical pattern, co...

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Autor principal: Yeyati, E.L.
Formato: JOUR
Materias:
Capital flows
Debt default
Sovereign debt
capital flow
capital market
credit provision
debt
developing world
insurance system
investment incentive
lending behavior
numerical model
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_09237992_v20_n4_p489_Yeyati
Aporte de:
Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires
id todo:paper_09237992_v20_n4_p489_Yeyati
record_format dspace
spelling todo:paper_09237992_v20_n4_p489_Yeyati2023-10-03T15:45:55Z Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries Yeyati, E.L. Capital flows Debt default Sovereign debt capital flow capital market credit provision debt developing world insurance system investment incentive lending behavior numerical model According to reputation models of sovereign debt, the incentives to repay are proportional to the income insurance benefits provided by the access to international markets. This paper, however, documents that private net lending to developing countries exhibits a procyclical or acyclical pattern, contradicting this premise. By contrast, official debt net flows exhibit a countercyclical patter. In addition, the paper shows that (both current and past) defaults are associated with lower net debt flows. The findings suggest that, while reputation models may explain the preferred creditor status enjoyed by official lenders, they cannot account for the presence of sovereign debt markets in developing countries. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008. JOUR info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_09237992_v20_n4_p489_Yeyati
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-134
collection Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA)
topic Capital flows
Debt default
Sovereign debt
capital flow
capital market
credit provision
debt
developing world
insurance system
investment incentive
lending behavior
numerical model
spellingShingle Capital flows
Debt default
Sovereign debt
capital flow
capital market
credit provision
debt
developing world
insurance system
investment incentive
lending behavior
numerical model
Yeyati, E.L.
Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries
topic_facet Capital flows
Debt default
Sovereign debt
capital flow
capital market
credit provision
debt
developing world
insurance system
investment incentive
lending behavior
numerical model
description According to reputation models of sovereign debt, the incentives to repay are proportional to the income insurance benefits provided by the access to international markets. This paper, however, documents that private net lending to developing countries exhibits a procyclical or acyclical pattern, contradicting this premise. By contrast, official debt net flows exhibit a countercyclical patter. In addition, the paper shows that (both current and past) defaults are associated with lower net debt flows. The findings suggest that, while reputation models may explain the preferred creditor status enjoyed by official lenders, they cannot account for the presence of sovereign debt markets in developing countries. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008.
format JOUR
author Yeyati, E.L.
author_facet Yeyati, E.L.
author_sort Yeyati, E.L.
title Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries
title_short Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries
title_full Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries
title_fullStr Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries
title_full_unstemmed Optimal debt? On the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries
title_sort optimal debt? on the insurance value of international debt flows to developing countries
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_09237992_v20_n4_p489_Yeyati
work_keys_str_mv AT yeyatiel optimaldebtontheinsurancevalueofinternationaldebtflowstodevelopingcountries
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