Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search

Most sponsored search auctions use the Generalized Second Price (GSP) rule. Given the GSP rule, they try to give an optimal allocation, an easy task when the only need is to allocate ads to slots. However, when other practical conditions must be fulfilled -such as budget constraints, exploration of...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Heiber, Pablo Ariel, Mydlarz, Marcelo
Publicado:	2009
Materias:	Budget constraint Optimal allocation Optimal auction Pricing rules Sponsored search auctions Optimization Commerce
Acceso en línea:	https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_03029743_v5564LNCS_n_p188_Feuerstein http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_03029743_v5564LNCS_n_p188_Feuerstein
Aporte de:	Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires

id	paper:paper_03029743_v5564LNCS_n_p188_Feuerstein
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spelling	paper:paper_03029743_v5564LNCS_n_p188_Feuerstein2023-06-08T15:28:31Z Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search Heiber, Pablo Ariel Mydlarz, Marcelo Budget constraint Optimal allocation Optimal auction Pricing rules Sponsored search auctions Optimization Commerce Most sponsored search auctions use the Generalized Second Price (GSP) rule. Given the GSP rule, they try to give an optimal allocation, an easy task when the only need is to allocate ads to slots. However, when other practical conditions must be fulfilled -such as budget constraints, exploration of the performance of new ads, etc.- optimal allocations are hard to obtain. We provide a method to optimally allocate ads to slots under the practical conditions mentioned above. Our auctions are stochastic, and can be applied in tandem with different pricing rules, among which we highlight two: an intuitive generalization of GSP and VCG payments. © 2009 Springer Berlin Heidelberg. Fil:Heiber, P.A. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales; Argentina. Fil:Mydlarz, M. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales; Argentina. 2009 https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_03029743_v5564LNCS_n_p188_Feuerstein http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_03029743_v5564LNCS_n_p188_Feuerstein
institution	Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str	I-28
repository_str	R-134
collection	Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA)
topic	Budget constraint Optimal allocation Optimal auction Pricing rules Sponsored search auctions Optimization Commerce
spellingShingle	Budget constraint Optimal allocation Optimal auction Pricing rules Sponsored search auctions Optimization Commerce Heiber, Pablo Ariel Mydlarz, Marcelo Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search
topic_facet	Budget constraint Optimal allocation Optimal auction Pricing rules Sponsored search auctions Optimization Commerce
description	Most sponsored search auctions use the Generalized Second Price (GSP) rule. Given the GSP rule, they try to give an optimal allocation, an easy task when the only need is to allocate ads to slots. However, when other practical conditions must be fulfilled -such as budget constraints, exploration of the performance of new ads, etc.- optimal allocations are hard to obtain. We provide a method to optimally allocate ads to slots under the practical conditions mentioned above. Our auctions are stochastic, and can be applied in tandem with different pricing rules, among which we highlight two: an intuitive generalization of GSP and VCG payments. © 2009 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
author	Heiber, Pablo Ariel Mydlarz, Marcelo
author_facet	Heiber, Pablo Ariel Mydlarz, Marcelo
author_sort	Heiber, Pablo Ariel
title	Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search
title_short	Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search
title_full	Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search
title_fullStr	Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search
title_full_unstemmed	Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search
title_sort	optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search
publishDate	2009
url	https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_03029743_v5564LNCS_n_p188_Feuerstein http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_03029743_v5564LNCS_n_p188_Feuerstein
work_keys_str_mv	AT heiberpabloariel optimalauctionscapturingconstraintsinsponsoredsearch AT mydlarzmarcelo optimalauctionscapturingconstraintsinsponsoredsearch
_version_	1768546443280252928

Optimal auctions capturing constraints in sponsored search

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