Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms
In this paper we analyze the existence of stable matchings in a two- sided large market in which workers are assigned to firms. The market has a continuum of workers while the set of firms is countably infinite. We show that, under certain reasonable assumptions on the preference correspondences, st...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | acceptedVersion Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
De Gruyter
2018
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://ri.unsam.edu.ar/handle/123456789/2755 |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | In this paper we analyze the existence of stable matchings in a two- sided large market in which workers are assigned to firms. The market has a continuum of workers while the set of firms is countably infinite. We show that, under certain reasonable assumptions on the preference correspondences, stable matchings not only exist but are also Pareto optimal. |
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