Nudging cooperation in a crowd experiment

We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed ev...

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Autores principales: Niella, Tamara, Stier-Moses, Nicolás, Sigman, Mariano
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2018
Materias:
Neuropsicología
Comportamiento
Motivación
Trabajo en grupo
Teoría de los juegos
Games
Thumbs
Eyes
Game theory
Behavior
Age distribution
Experimental psychology
Random variables
Acceso en línea:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147125
https://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/11069
Aporte de:
Repositorio Digital Universidad Torcuato Di Tella de Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
id I57-R16320.500.13098-11069
record_format dspace
institution Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
institution_str I-57
repository_str R-163
collection Repositorio Digital Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
language Inglés
orig_language_str_mv eng
topic Neuropsicología
Comportamiento
Motivación
Trabajo en grupo
Teoría de los juegos
Games
Thumbs
Eyes
Game theory
Behavior
Age distribution
Experimental psychology
Random variables
spellingShingle Neuropsicología
Comportamiento
Motivación
Trabajo en grupo
Teoría de los juegos
Games
Thumbs
Eyes
Game theory
Behavior
Age distribution
Experimental psychology
Random variables
Niella, Tamara
Stier-Moses, Nicolás
Sigman, Mariano
Nudging cooperation in a crowd experiment
description We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a controlled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have vast practical consequences to our society.
format Artículo
publishedVersion
author Niella, Tamara
Stier-Moses, Nicolás
Sigman, Mariano
author_facet Niella, Tamara
Stier-Moses, Nicolás
Sigman, Mariano
author_sort Niella, Tamara
title Nudging cooperation in a crowd experiment
title_short Nudging cooperation in a crowd experiment
title_full Nudging cooperation in a crowd experiment
title_fullStr Nudging cooperation in a crowd experiment
title_full_unstemmed Nudging cooperation in a crowd experiment
title_sort nudging cooperation in a crowd experiment
publishDate 2018
url https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147125
https://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/11069
work_keys_str_mv AT niellatamara nudgingcooperationinacrowdexperiment
AT stiermosesnicolas nudgingcooperationinacrowdexperiment
AT sigmanmariano nudgingcooperationinacrowdexperiment
bdutipo_str Repositorios
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