Regulation in the cable televisión industry

Beyond any political implications surrounding the regulation of media, the purpose of this work is to study the mechanism through which prices of channels are set in the television industry and to analyse the impact that measures which attempt to disolute big media corporations may have on total pro...

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Autores principales: Hatrick, Agustina, Montamat, Giselle, Ries, Vivian Alexis
Otros Autores: Raybaudi Massilia, Marzia
Formato: Tesis de grado acceptedVersion
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad Torcuato Di Tella 2017
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/1505
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id I57-R163-20.500.13098-1505
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spelling I57-R163-20.500.13098-15052024-01-03T20:25:02Z Regulation in the cable televisión industry Hatrick, Agustina Montamat, Giselle Ries, Vivian Alexis Raybaudi Massilia, Marzia Universidad Torcuato Di Tella Televisión por cable Monopolios Legislación -- Televisión -- Análisis comparativo Infraestructura de comunicaciones Tesis Beyond any political implications surrounding the regulation of media, the purpose of this work is to study the mechanism through which prices of channels are set in the television industry and to analyse the impact that measures which attempt to disolute big media corporations may have on total producer surplus. Following much of the literature that exists on this subject, we model the TV industry by means of a chain of production in which two program providers, the upstream firms, sell their channels to one monopolistic cable operator, the downstream firm. We do not allow for competition between upstream firms to avoid technicalities regarding product differentiation (for more on oligopolistic competition between upstream firms, see Bourreau, Hombert et al. 2010); instead, we think of each channel as unique and each program provider as a monopoly of the content it sells. We do allow for heterogeneity in the consumers´ valuation for each channel. Under this setting, we study how the interaction between the members of the chain and the prices they set is affected when firms that are initially integrated are obliged to desintegrate. As we shall see, one of the consequences that we will encounter is the well-known vertical externality of double marginalization, first introduced and studied by Cournot (1838)-Spengler (1950). Esta tesis en PDF no tiene permisos por parte del autor para ser reproducida. Puedes venir a consultarla a la Biblioteca Di Tella pero recuerda que no podrás copiarla, ni grabarla en ningún dispositivo, ni enviarla, ni imprimirla. La consulta se hace solo bajo reserva escribiendo a serviciosbiblio@utdt.edu. Si eres el autor de la tesis y quieres dar tu autorización para la reproducción, puedes ponerte en contacto con repositorio@utdt.edu. 2017-04-03T16:16:35Z 2017-04-03T16:16:35Z 2013 2013 info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion https://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/1505 spa info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess 85 p. : application/pdf application/pdf application/zip Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
institution Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
institution_str I-57
repository_str R-163
collection Repositorio Digital Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
language Español
orig_language_str_mv spa
topic Televisión por cable
Monopolios
Legislación -- Televisión -- Análisis comparativo
Infraestructura de comunicaciones
Tesis
spellingShingle Televisión por cable
Monopolios
Legislación -- Televisión -- Análisis comparativo
Infraestructura de comunicaciones
Tesis
Hatrick, Agustina
Montamat, Giselle
Ries, Vivian Alexis
Regulation in the cable televisión industry
topic_facet Televisión por cable
Monopolios
Legislación -- Televisión -- Análisis comparativo
Infraestructura de comunicaciones
Tesis
description Beyond any political implications surrounding the regulation of media, the purpose of this work is to study the mechanism through which prices of channels are set in the television industry and to analyse the impact that measures which attempt to disolute big media corporations may have on total producer surplus. Following much of the literature that exists on this subject, we model the TV industry by means of a chain of production in which two program providers, the upstream firms, sell their channels to one monopolistic cable operator, the downstream firm. We do not allow for competition between upstream firms to avoid technicalities regarding product differentiation (for more on oligopolistic competition between upstream firms, see Bourreau, Hombert et al. 2010); instead, we think of each channel as unique and each program provider as a monopoly of the content it sells. We do allow for heterogeneity in the consumers´ valuation for each channel. Under this setting, we study how the interaction between the members of the chain and the prices they set is affected when firms that are initially integrated are obliged to desintegrate. As we shall see, one of the consequences that we will encounter is the well-known vertical externality of double marginalization, first introduced and studied by Cournot (1838)-Spengler (1950).
author2 Raybaudi Massilia, Marzia
author_facet Raybaudi Massilia, Marzia
Hatrick, Agustina
Montamat, Giselle
Ries, Vivian Alexis
format Tesis de grado
acceptedVersion
author Hatrick, Agustina
Montamat, Giselle
Ries, Vivian Alexis
author_sort Hatrick, Agustina
title Regulation in the cable televisión industry
title_short Regulation in the cable televisión industry
title_full Regulation in the cable televisión industry
title_fullStr Regulation in the cable televisión industry
title_full_unstemmed Regulation in the cable televisión industry
title_sort regulation in the cable televisión industry
publisher Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
publishDate 2017
url https://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/1505
work_keys_str_mv AT hatrickagustina regulationinthecabletelevisionindustry
AT montamatgiselle regulationinthecabletelevisionindustry
AT riesvivianalexis regulationinthecabletelevisionindustry
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