Representation and Delegation in Trade Policymaking: The Political Economy of Trade Taxes in Argentina

The literature typically argues that legislative influence on trade policy is scant and reactive because trade policymaking power is largely delegated to the executive. Bridging the literatures on political economy and legislative politics, we analyze legislative activity on trade taxes in a sett...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Bonvecchi, Alejandro, Clerici, Paula
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Studies in Comparative International Development (e-ISSN: 1936-6167) 2024
Materias:
Trade taxes
Impuestos al comercio
Federalism
Federalismo
Legislative politics
Legislator's behavior
Acceso en línea:https://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/13143
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-024-09448- w
Aporte de:
Repositorio Digital Universidad Torcuato Di Tella de Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
id I57-R163-20.500.13098-13143
record_format dspace
spelling I57-R163-20.500.13098-131432024-11-09T07:00:10Z Representation and Delegation in Trade Policymaking: The Political Economy of Trade Taxes in Argentina Bonvecchi, Alejandro Clerici, Paula Trade taxes Impuestos al comercio Federalism Federalismo Legislative politics Legislator's behavior The literature typically argues that legislative influence on trade policy is scant and reactive because trade policymaking power is largely delegated to the executive. Bridging the literatures on political economy and legislative politics, we analyze legislative activity on trade taxes in a setting in which delegated powers reverted to the legislature after decades under executive jurisdiction: the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Our findings reveal that delegation is the prevailing strategy, legislators intervene prompted by economic shocks, and the contents of their initiatives are contingent to the effects of shocks on local economies. When appreciation rages or devaluation is insufficient, legislators representing export-oriented economies submit liberalizing bills, and those representing inward-oriented economies submit protectionist initiatives. Otherwise, delegation remains the norm and legislators strategically employ declarative bills to signal their preferred policies. Por motivos relacionados con los derechos de autor este documento solo puede ser consultado en la Biblioteca Di Tella. Para reservar una cita podés ponerte en contacto con repositorio@utdt.edu. Este artículo se encuentra originalmente publicado en Studies in Comparative International Development (e-ISSN: 1936-6167) 2024-11-08T22:01:56Z 2024-11-08T22:01:56Z 2024-11-06 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/13143 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-024-09448- w eng Studies in Comparative International Development (e-ISSN: 1936-6167) info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=es 27 p. application/pdf application/pdf Studies in Comparative International Development (e-ISSN: 1936-6167)
institution Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
institution_str I-57
repository_str R-163
collection Repositorio Digital Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
language Inglés
orig_language_str_mv eng
topic Trade taxes
Impuestos al comercio
Federalism
Federalismo
Legislative politics
Legislator's behavior
spellingShingle Trade taxes
Impuestos al comercio
Federalism
Federalismo
Legislative politics
Legislator's behavior
Bonvecchi, Alejandro
Clerici, Paula
Representation and Delegation in Trade Policymaking: The Political Economy of Trade Taxes in Argentina
topic_facet Trade taxes
Impuestos al comercio
Federalism
Federalismo
Legislative politics
Legislator's behavior
description The literature typically argues that legislative influence on trade policy is scant and reactive because trade policymaking power is largely delegated to the executive. Bridging the literatures on political economy and legislative politics, we analyze legislative activity on trade taxes in a setting in which delegated powers reverted to the legislature after decades under executive jurisdiction: the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Our findings reveal that delegation is the prevailing strategy, legislators intervene prompted by economic shocks, and the contents of their initiatives are contingent to the effects of shocks on local economies. When appreciation rages or devaluation is insufficient, legislators representing export-oriented economies submit liberalizing bills, and those representing inward-oriented economies submit protectionist initiatives. Otherwise, delegation remains the norm and legislators strategically employ declarative bills to signal their preferred policies.
format Artículo
publishedVersion
author Bonvecchi, Alejandro
Clerici, Paula
author_facet Bonvecchi, Alejandro
Clerici, Paula
author_sort Bonvecchi, Alejandro
title Representation and Delegation in Trade Policymaking: The Political Economy of Trade Taxes in Argentina
title_short Representation and Delegation in Trade Policymaking: The Political Economy of Trade Taxes in Argentina
title_full Representation and Delegation in Trade Policymaking: The Political Economy of Trade Taxes in Argentina
title_fullStr Representation and Delegation in Trade Policymaking: The Political Economy of Trade Taxes in Argentina
title_full_unstemmed Representation and Delegation in Trade Policymaking: The Political Economy of Trade Taxes in Argentina
title_sort representation and delegation in trade policymaking: the political economy of trade taxes in argentina
publisher Studies in Comparative International Development (e-ISSN: 1936-6167)
publishDate 2024
url https://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/13143
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-024-09448- w
work_keys_str_mv AT bonvecchialejandro representationanddelegationintradepolicymakingthepoliticaleconomyoftradetaxesinargentina
AT clericipaula representationanddelegationintradepolicymakingthepoliticaleconomyoftradetaxesinargentina
_version_ 1823894525063462912

Ejemplares similares