The Paradox of Freedom: Analysis of the Necessity of Evil in Augustinian Freedom
This article examines the paradox of freedom in Augustine's philosophy, focusing on the relationship between freedom and the necessity of evil. Beginning with an analysis of the concept of free will and its distinction from libertas, we explore the tension between the human capacity to choose a...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Humanidades. Instituto de Filosofía
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/ach/article/view/8518 |
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| Sumario: | This article examines the paradox of freedom in Augustine's philosophy, focusing on the relationship between freedom and the necessity of evil. Beginning with an analysis of the concept of free will and its distinction from libertas, we explore the tension between the human capacity to choose and the inevitability of sin. St. Augustine argues that true freedom can only be achieved by choosing the good, but this choice presupposes the existence of evil as a possibility, thus, we investigate the function of evil within the Augustinian system and its apparent contradiction with the notion of an omnibenevolent God. Central to this is the question of whether the existence of evil is merely an obstacle or whether, paradoxically, it plays a necessary role in the configuration of human freedom. Finally, the argument turns out that, in the Augustinian framework, evil is not an indispensable condition for true freedom, but rather its presence serves as a means of learning and delimitation of what keeps us from fullness. |
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