Analytic Method and Lack of Synthesis in “The analytic Knowing” in Hegel’s Science of Logic
In “The idea of Knowing” of the Science of Logic, Hegel intends to deal with the analytic and synthetic methods, which have played an important role in modern science and modern philosophy. In this paper, I intend to study the subsection “The analytic knowing” in order to clarify its specific releva...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Instituto de Filosofía - Facultad de Humanidades. UNNE
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unne.edu.ar/index.php/nit/article/view/6199 |
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| Sumario: | In “The idea of Knowing” of the Science of Logic, Hegel intends to deal with the analytic and synthetic methods, which have played an important role in modern science and modern philosophy. In this paper, I intend to study the subsection “The analytic knowing” in order to clarify its specific relevance to the rational development of Hegel’s Logic. In this sense, I state that “The analytic knowing” presents three topics that seem to be only slightly connected: the analytic method, arithmetic, and synthetic judgments a priori. The study of this section will show that there is a guiding thread: the lack of Fortgang or advance. Thus, I will state that the goal of this section is to exhibit different ways in which there may lack synthesis and advance, and, accordingly, the need to overcome this lack and leave open the path toward a conceptually more accurate treatment of the synthesis. |
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