Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: an application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011

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We examine the impact of descentralized public policy in the form of inter-governmental fi scal transfers on local election outcomes –the probability of reelection. We assemble a new and unique dataset recording every local ex-ecutive election in the period 1995-2011 and examine the electoral effect...

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Autores principales: Freille, Sebastián, Capello, Marcelo
Formato: Artículo acceptedVersion
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2014
Materias:
JF Instituciones políticas (General)
Acceso en línea:http://pa.bibdigital.ucc.edu.ar/4196/1/A_Freille_Capello.pdf
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Producción Académica Universidad Católica de Córdoba (UCCor) de Universidad Católica de Córdoba
id I38-R144-4196
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spelling I38-R144-41962024-02-28T18:10:35Z http://pa.bibdigital.ucc.edu.ar/4196/ Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: an application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011 Freille, Sebastián Capello, Marcelo JF Instituciones políticas (General) We examine the impact of descentralized public policy in the form of inter-governmental fi scal transfers on local election outcomes –the probability of reelection. We assemble a new and unique dataset recording every local ex-ecutive election in the period 1995-2011 and examine the electoral effect of various types of intergovernmental fi scal transfers. We fi nd that the odds of reelecting local incumbents are increasing in the incumbency dummies for both major parties. Local governments which receive a positive discretion-ary transfer from the provincial government have also associated higher odds of being reelected. The probability of reelection is also increasing in the difference in the vote share between the winner and the runner up in the previous election. Finally we fi nd evidence that the amount of discretionary transfers per capita affect positively the probability of reelection only in those governments aligned with the provincial government. Our results are robust to controlling for other potential explanatory variables. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2014-12-31 application/pdf spa http://pa.bibdigital.ucc.edu.ar/4196/1/A_Freille_Capello.pdf Freille, Sebastián ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1458-0929 <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1458-0929> and Capello, Marcelo (2014) Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: an application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011. Revista de Economía y Estadística, 52 (1). ISSN 2451-7321 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Fil: Freille, Sebastián. Universidad Católica de Córdoba. Unidad Asociada CONICET - Área de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades; Argentina Fil: Capello, Marcelo. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Argentina info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.es
institution Universidad Católica de Córdoba
institution_str I-38
repository_str R-144
collection Producción Académica Universidad Católica de Córdoba (UCCor)
language Español
orig_language_str_mv spa
topic JF Instituciones políticas (General)
spellingShingle JF Instituciones políticas (General)
Freille, Sebastián
Capello, Marcelo
Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: an application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
topic_facet JF Instituciones políticas (General)
description We examine the impact of descentralized public policy in the form of inter-governmental fi scal transfers on local election outcomes –the probability of reelection. We assemble a new and unique dataset recording every local ex-ecutive election in the period 1995-2011 and examine the electoral effect of various types of intergovernmental fi scal transfers. We fi nd that the odds of reelecting local incumbents are increasing in the incumbency dummies for both major parties. Local governments which receive a positive discretion-ary transfer from the provincial government have also associated higher odds of being reelected. The probability of reelection is also increasing in the difference in the vote share between the winner and the runner up in the previous election. Finally we fi nd evidence that the amount of discretionary transfers per capita affect positively the probability of reelection only in those governments aligned with the provincial government. Our results are robust to controlling for other potential explanatory variables.
format Artículo
Artículo
acceptedVersion
author Freille, Sebastián
Capello, Marcelo
author_facet Freille, Sebastián
Capello, Marcelo
author_sort Freille, Sebastián
title Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: an application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
title_short Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: an application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
title_full Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: an application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
title_fullStr Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: an application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
title_full_unstemmed Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: an application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
title_sort electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: an application to local elections in the province of cordoba, 1995-2011
publisher Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
publishDate 2014
url http://pa.bibdigital.ucc.edu.ar/4196/1/A_Freille_Capello.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT freillesebastian electoraleffectsofintergovernmentalfiscaltransfersanapplicationtolocalelectionsintheprovinceofcordoba19952011
AT capellomarcelo electoraleffectsofintergovernmentalfiscaltransfersanapplicationtolocalelectionsintheprovinceofcordoba19952011
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