A rent-seeking coalition and efficiency losses

Fil: Spialtini, Valentin. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.

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Autor principal: Spialtini, Valentin
Otros Autores: Einstoss Mastracchio, Sebastián Nicolás
Formato: Tesis Tesis de maestría updatedVersion
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía 2025
Acceso en línea:https://repositorio.udesa.edu.ar/handle/10908/25751
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Repositorio Digital - Universidad de San Andrés (UdeSa) de Universidad de San Andrés
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spelling I37-R143-10908-257512025-09-20T03:01:02Z A rent-seeking coalition and efficiency losses Spialtini, Valentin Einstoss Mastracchio, Sebastián Nicolás Fil: Spialtini, Valentin. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze the efficiency losses caused by rent-seeking coalitions that, protected by institutional arrangements, block the entry of more productive firms into the market. Once entry is deterred, the coalition endogenously chooses to operate with a suboptimal level of productivity —even in the absence of adoption costs— in order to maximize internal rents. We calibrate the model and show that aggregate output is strictly lower under the monopoly equilibrium. To illustrate the empirical relevance of the mechanism, we examine two case studies from Argentina’s transport sector. We provide evidence that truck drivers earn a wage premium relative to comparable formal workers, and that Aerolíneas Argentinas increased productivity and reduced government support when exposed to greater competition. 2025-09-19T13:30:57Z 2025-09-19T13:30:57Z 2025-07 Tesis info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis info:ar-repo/semantics/tesis de maestría info:eu-repo/semantics/updatedVersion https://repositorio.udesa.edu.ar/handle/10908/25751 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf application/pdf Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
institution Universidad de San Andrés
institution_str I-37
repository_str R-143
collection Repositorio Digital - Universidad de San Andrés (UdeSa)
language Inglés
description Fil: Spialtini, Valentin. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
author2 Einstoss Mastracchio, Sebastián Nicolás
author_facet Einstoss Mastracchio, Sebastián Nicolás
Spialtini, Valentin
format Tesis
Tesis de maestría
Tesis de maestría
updatedVersion
author Spialtini, Valentin
spellingShingle Spialtini, Valentin
A rent-seeking coalition and efficiency losses
author_sort Spialtini, Valentin
title A rent-seeking coalition and efficiency losses
title_short A rent-seeking coalition and efficiency losses
title_full A rent-seeking coalition and efficiency losses
title_fullStr A rent-seeking coalition and efficiency losses
title_full_unstemmed A rent-seeking coalition and efficiency losses
title_sort rent-seeking coalition and efficiency losses
publisher Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
publishDate 2025
url https://repositorio.udesa.edu.ar/handle/10908/25751
work_keys_str_mv AT spialtinivalentin arentseekingcoalitionandefficiencylosses
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