Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare

Fil: Drenik, Andrés Pablo. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Drenik, Andrés Pablo
Otros Autores: Pérez Truglia, Ricardo Nicolás
Formato: Tesis Tesis de maestría updatedVersion
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía 2020
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10908/17073
Aporte de:
Repositorio Digital - Universidad de San Andrés (UdeSa) de Universidad de San Andrés
id I37-R143-10908-17073
record_format dspace
spelling I37-R143-10908-170732025-01-20T15:23:21Z Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare Drenik, Andrés Pablo Pérez Truglia, Ricardo Nicolás Fil: Drenik, Andrés Pablo. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. We study the role of fairness concerns in the demand for redistribution through workfare. In the first part of the paper, we present new evidence from a survey experiment. We show that individuals are more generous towards poor people whom they perceive to be diligent workers relative to poor people whom they perceive to be non-diligent, a social preference that we label sympathy for the diligent. This preference is much stronger than preferences regarding other characteristics of the poor, such as race, nationality, and disability. More important, we show that subjects with higher sympathy for the diligent have a stronger preference for workfare programs. In the second part of the paper, we incorporate our empirical findings into a model of income redistribution. We consider the case of a benevolent government with fairness concerns that prioritizes the well-being of individuals who exert the most effort. We characterize the optimal conditions under which the government introduces work requirements. Even if wasteful, work requirements can be optimal, because they allow for a better distinction between individuals who exert great effort and individuals who do not. However, if the government lacks commitment power, the availability of screening through work requirements leads to a lower equilibrium effort and, possibly, a Pareto-dominated allocation. 2020-03-09T17:51:39Z 2020-03-09T17:51:39Z 2019-07 Tesis info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis info:ar-repo/semantics/tesis de maestría info:eu-repo/semantics/updatedVersion Drenik, A. P. (2019). Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare. [Tesis de maestría, Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía]. Repositorio Digital San Andrés. http://hdl.handle.net/10908/17073 http://hdl.handle.net/10908/17073 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf application/pdf Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
institution Universidad de San Andrés
institution_str I-37
repository_str R-143
collection Repositorio Digital - Universidad de San Andrés (UdeSa)
language Inglés
description Fil: Drenik, Andrés Pablo. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
author2 Pérez Truglia, Ricardo Nicolás
author_facet Pérez Truglia, Ricardo Nicolás
Drenik, Andrés Pablo
format Tesis
Tesis de maestría
Tesis de maestría
updatedVersion
author Drenik, Andrés Pablo
spellingShingle Drenik, Andrés Pablo
Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
author_sort Drenik, Andrés Pablo
title Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
title_short Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
title_full Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
title_fullStr Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
title_full_unstemmed Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
title_sort sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
publisher Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
publishDate 2020
url http://hdl.handle.net/10908/17073
work_keys_str_mv AT drenikandrespablo sympathyforthediligentandthedemandforworkfare
_version_ 1824438879867895808

Ejemplares similares