Effects of subnational heterogeneity on fiscal discipline : a legislative game

Fil: Habermacher, Daniel. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.

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Autor principal: Habermacher, Daniel
Otros Autores: Tommasi, Mariano
Formato: Tesis Tesis de maestría updatedVersion
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía 1/23
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Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10908/11936
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spelling I37-R143-10908-119362025-01-29T16:35:05Z Effects of subnational heterogeneity on fiscal discipline : a legislative game Habermacher, Daniel Tommasi, Mariano Intergovernmental fiscal relations -- Political aspects -- Mathematical models. Fiscal policy -- Mathematical models. Finance, Public -- Mathematical models. Legislative bodies -- Voting -- Mathematical models. Relaciones fiscales intergubernamentales -- Aspectos políticos -- Modelos matemáticos. Política fiscal -- Modelos matemáticos. Finanzas públicas -- Modelos matemáticos. Cuerpos legislativos -- Voto -- Modelos matemáticos. Fil: Habermacher, Daniel. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. This article studies how differences in subnational financial strength influence legislative resolutions regarding fiscal matters in federal countries. Legislative coalitions give birth to institutions that shape subnational fiscal incentives. The approach works for particular early periods in federals countries’ history, which we define as “constitutional moments”. Downsian-elected representatives from each region form the Senate, which must decide over a federal grant system. The grant bill will be passed depending on the regional distribution of its costs, given that there is a majority requirement. Some extensions regarding the inter-regional distribution of population, state-specific grants, and the incentives for blocking coalitions are analyzed. Finally, we explore the model’s empirical relevance with a brief survey on the early fiscal federalism in the U.S, Argentina, and Germany. 1/23/2017 15:13Z 1/23/2017 15:13Z 2016-09-07 Tesis info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis info:ar-repo/semantics/tesis de maestría info:eu-repo/semantics/updatedVersion Habermacher, D. (2016). Effects of subnational heterogeneity on fiscal discipline : a legislative game. [Tesis de maestría, Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía]. Repositorio Digital San Andrés. http://hdl.handle.net/10908/11936 Tesis M. Eco. 93 http://hdl.handle.net/10908/11936 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf application/pdf Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
institution Universidad de San Andrés
institution_str I-37
repository_str R-143
collection Repositorio Digital - Universidad de San Andrés (UdeSa)
language Inglés
topic Intergovernmental fiscal relations -- Political aspects -- Mathematical models.
Fiscal policy -- Mathematical models.
Finance, Public -- Mathematical models.
Legislative bodies -- Voting -- Mathematical models.
Relaciones fiscales intergubernamentales -- Aspectos políticos -- Modelos matemáticos.
Política fiscal -- Modelos matemáticos.
Finanzas públicas -- Modelos matemáticos.
Cuerpos legislativos -- Voto -- Modelos matemáticos.
spellingShingle Intergovernmental fiscal relations -- Political aspects -- Mathematical models.
Fiscal policy -- Mathematical models.
Finance, Public -- Mathematical models.
Legislative bodies -- Voting -- Mathematical models.
Relaciones fiscales intergubernamentales -- Aspectos políticos -- Modelos matemáticos.
Política fiscal -- Modelos matemáticos.
Finanzas públicas -- Modelos matemáticos.
Cuerpos legislativos -- Voto -- Modelos matemáticos.
Habermacher, Daniel
Effects of subnational heterogeneity on fiscal discipline : a legislative game
topic_facet Intergovernmental fiscal relations -- Political aspects -- Mathematical models.
Fiscal policy -- Mathematical models.
Finance, Public -- Mathematical models.
Legislative bodies -- Voting -- Mathematical models.
Relaciones fiscales intergubernamentales -- Aspectos políticos -- Modelos matemáticos.
Política fiscal -- Modelos matemáticos.
Finanzas públicas -- Modelos matemáticos.
Cuerpos legislativos -- Voto -- Modelos matemáticos.
description Fil: Habermacher, Daniel. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
author2 Tommasi, Mariano
author_facet Tommasi, Mariano
Habermacher, Daniel
format Tesis
Tesis de maestría
Tesis de maestría
updatedVersion
author Habermacher, Daniel
author_sort Habermacher, Daniel
title Effects of subnational heterogeneity on fiscal discipline : a legislative game
title_short Effects of subnational heterogeneity on fiscal discipline : a legislative game
title_full Effects of subnational heterogeneity on fiscal discipline : a legislative game
title_fullStr Effects of subnational heterogeneity on fiscal discipline : a legislative game
title_full_unstemmed Effects of subnational heterogeneity on fiscal discipline : a legislative game
title_sort effects of subnational heterogeneity on fiscal discipline : a legislative game
publisher Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
publishDate 1/23
url http://hdl.handle.net/10908/11936
work_keys_str_mv AT habermacherdaniel effectsofsubnationalheterogeneityonfiscaldisciplinealegislativegame
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