With a little help from the opposition? : relaxing term limits in the argentine provinces, 1983–2017

Abstract: How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the...

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Autores principales: Lucardi, Adrián, Almaraz, María Gabriela
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Institute of Latin American Studies 2019
Materias:
CIENCIA POLITICA
ARGENTINA
REFORMA POLITICA
REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL
PROVINCIAS
PODER EJECUTIVO
SISTEMA POLITICO
ELECCIONES
Acceso en línea:https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/7930
Aporte de:
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA) de Universidad Católica Argentina
id I33-R139123456789-7930
record_format dspace
institution Universidad Católica Argentina
institution_str I-33
repository_str R-139
collection Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA)
language Inglés
topic CIENCIA POLITICA
ARGENTINA
REFORMA POLITICA
REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL
PROVINCIAS
PODER EJECUTIVO
SISTEMA POLITICO
ELECCIONES
spellingShingle CIENCIA POLITICA
ARGENTINA
REFORMA POLITICA
REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL
PROVINCIAS
PODER EJECUTIVO
SISTEMA POLITICO
ELECCIONES
Lucardi, Adrián
Almaraz, María Gabriela
With a little help from the opposition? : relaxing term limits in the argentine provinces, 1983–2017
topic_facet CIENCIA POLITICA
ARGENTINA
REFORMA POLITICA
REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL
PROVINCIAS
PODER EJECUTIVO
SISTEMA POLITICO
ELECCIONES
description Abstract: How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally, or (b) the opposition is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects; moreover, (c) this second effect should be stronger when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform because this precludes the executive from playing a “divide-and-rule” strategy. We examine these claims with data from the Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2017. In line with expectations, the results show that the probability of initiating a reform is highest when the executive’s party controls a supermajority of seats, but falls sharply when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform and this party expects to do well in the next executive election.
format Artículo
author Lucardi, Adrián
Almaraz, María Gabriela
author_facet Lucardi, Adrián
Almaraz, María Gabriela
author_sort Lucardi, Adrián
title With a little help from the opposition? : relaxing term limits in the argentine provinces, 1983–2017
title_short With a little help from the opposition? : relaxing term limits in the argentine provinces, 1983–2017
title_full With a little help from the opposition? : relaxing term limits in the argentine provinces, 1983–2017
title_fullStr With a little help from the opposition? : relaxing term limits in the argentine provinces, 1983–2017
title_full_unstemmed With a little help from the opposition? : relaxing term limits in the argentine provinces, 1983–2017
title_sort with a little help from the opposition? : relaxing term limits in the argentine provinces, 1983–2017
publisher German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Institute of Latin American Studies
publishDate 2019
url https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/7930
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bdutipo_str Repositorios
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