Political ambition and subnational redistributive spending

Abstract: Government spending is a powerful tool subnational incumbents can utilise to favour different social groups in a federation. As such, it spreads out redistributive conflicts over who gets what (and how) in multi-level democracies. Schematically, subnational governments can either benefit s...

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Autores principales: González, Lucas Isaac, Lodola, Germán
Formato: Parte de libro
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: European Consortium for Political Research 2023
Materias:
REDISTRIBUCION
FINANZAS PUBLICAS
FEDERALISMO
GASTO PUBLICO
POLITICA
GOBERNADORES
Acceso en línea:https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/17114
Aporte de:
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA) de Universidad Católica Argentina
id I33-R139-123456789-17114
record_format dspace
spelling I33-R139-123456789-171142023-09-15T05:01:22Z Political ambition and subnational redistributive spending González, Lucas Isaac Lodola, Germán REDISTRIBUCION FINANZAS PUBLICAS FEDERALISMO GASTO PUBLICO POLITICA GOBERNADORES Abstract: Government spending is a powerful tool subnational incumbents can utilise to favour different social groups in a federation. As such, it spreads out redistributive conflicts over who gets what (and how) in multi-level democracies. Schematically, subnational governments can either benefit specific groups by allocating public resources to particularistic goods or they can favour a large majority of citizens by delivering collective goods. In this chapter, we analyse the institutional, contextual, and individual-level factors that affect subnational governments’ redistributive spending choices. In contrast to prior research that has concentrated on both institutional and contextual determinants of government spending, we emphasise that individual factors largely explain why subnational incumbents decide to reward certain groups of citizens over others thus shaping redistributive conflicts within their territorial jurisdictions. Our central claim is that subnational executives’ (i.e., state governors) office ambitions – whether they are national-centred or state-centred – affect their decisions to strategically allocate social infrastructure (collective) and civil administration (particularistic) expenditures by delineating different electoral linkages between politicians and citizens. More concretely, governors who seek to remain in their districts will favour their core supporters and invest in patronage-based networks of political support by distributing targeted particularistic goods. On the contrary, governors who aspire to gain popularity beyond their districts in order to build a national career will target larger constituencies by providing collective goods, which are broader in scope and more visible. 2023-09-14T19:20:22Z 2023-09-14T19:20:22Z 2017 Parte de libro González, L. I., Lodola, G. Political ambition and subnational redistributive spending [en línea]. En: Gordin, J., RennoInstitutional, L. (eds.) Innovation and the Steering of Conflicts in Latin America. Reino Unido : ECPR Press, 2017. Disponible en: https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/17114 978-1785522314 https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/17114 eng Acceso abierto http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf European Consortium for Political Research Gordin, J., RennoInstitutional, L. (eds.) Innovation and the Steering of Conflicts in Latin America. Reino Unido : ECPR Press, 2017
institution Universidad Católica Argentina
institution_str I-33
repository_str R-139
collection Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA)
language Inglés
topic REDISTRIBUCION
FINANZAS PUBLICAS
FEDERALISMO
GASTO PUBLICO
POLITICA
GOBERNADORES
spellingShingle REDISTRIBUCION
FINANZAS PUBLICAS
FEDERALISMO
GASTO PUBLICO
POLITICA
GOBERNADORES
González, Lucas Isaac
Lodola, Germán
Political ambition and subnational redistributive spending
topic_facet REDISTRIBUCION
FINANZAS PUBLICAS
FEDERALISMO
GASTO PUBLICO
POLITICA
GOBERNADORES
description Abstract: Government spending is a powerful tool subnational incumbents can utilise to favour different social groups in a federation. As such, it spreads out redistributive conflicts over who gets what (and how) in multi-level democracies. Schematically, subnational governments can either benefit specific groups by allocating public resources to particularistic goods or they can favour a large majority of citizens by delivering collective goods. In this chapter, we analyse the institutional, contextual, and individual-level factors that affect subnational governments’ redistributive spending choices. In contrast to prior research that has concentrated on both institutional and contextual determinants of government spending, we emphasise that individual factors largely explain why subnational incumbents decide to reward certain groups of citizens over others thus shaping redistributive conflicts within their territorial jurisdictions. Our central claim is that subnational executives’ (i.e., state governors) office ambitions – whether they are national-centred or state-centred – affect their decisions to strategically allocate social infrastructure (collective) and civil administration (particularistic) expenditures by delineating different electoral linkages between politicians and citizens. More concretely, governors who seek to remain in their districts will favour their core supporters and invest in patronage-based networks of political support by distributing targeted particularistic goods. On the contrary, governors who aspire to gain popularity beyond their districts in order to build a national career will target larger constituencies by providing collective goods, which are broader in scope and more visible.
format Parte de libro
author González, Lucas Isaac
Lodola, Germán
author_facet González, Lucas Isaac
Lodola, Germán
author_sort González, Lucas Isaac
title Political ambition and subnational redistributive spending
title_short Political ambition and subnational redistributive spending
title_full Political ambition and subnational redistributive spending
title_fullStr Political ambition and subnational redistributive spending
title_full_unstemmed Political ambition and subnational redistributive spending
title_sort political ambition and subnational redistributive spending
publisher European Consortium for Political Research
publishDate 2023
url https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/17114
work_keys_str_mv AT gonzalezlucasisaac politicalambitionandsubnationalredistributivespending
AT lodolagerman politicalambitionandsubnationalredistributivespending
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