Voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats

Resumen: Can opportunities for undergoing voluntary oversight improve bureaucratic motivation and effort? Drawing on insights fromthe social sciences, we argue that voluntary oversight increases front-line bureaucrats’ sense of autonomy and competence, and may therefore increase their motivation a...

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Autores principales: O, Ana L. de la, González, Lucas Isaac, Weitz Shapiro, Rebecca
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Elsevier 2023
Materias:
SUPERVISION
AUDITORIA
BUROCRACIA
TRABAJO DE CAMPO
ESCUELA PRIMARIA
Acceso en línea:https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/16417
Aporte de:
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA) de Universidad Católica Argentina
id I33-R139-123456789-16417
record_format dspace
spelling I33-R139-123456789-164172023-06-14T05:01:35Z Voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats O, Ana L. de la González, Lucas Isaac Weitz Shapiro, Rebecca SUPERVISION AUDITORIA BUROCRACIA TRABAJO DE CAMPO ESCUELA PRIMARIA Resumen: Can opportunities for undergoing voluntary oversight improve bureaucratic motivation and effort? Drawing on insights fromthe social sciences, we argue that voluntary oversight increases front-line bureaucrats’ sense of autonomy and competence, and may therefore increase their motivation and effort. Partnering with a provincial auditing body in Argentina, we implement an encouragement design in which school principals are invited to receive a voluntary audit of a publicly funded schoolmeal program.We employ a two-level randomization, in which regions are first randomly assigned to a higher or lower rate of invitations, and then schoolswithin regions are randomly assigned to treatment or control.We find divergent effects of treatment based onthe density of treatment; inthe groupof regions assigned to the lower rate of invitations, school principals assigned to treatment report increased motivation and a decrease in school closings. In contrast, in the group of regions assigned to the higher rate of invitations, we observe the opposite effect. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork, we speculate that a higher rate of invitationsmay generate pressure to accept the invitation and thereby undermine any positive effects of volunteering. Our results suggest the promise of voluntary audits as well as the need for further research on the conditions under which voluntary oversight may have differing consequences for bureaucratic effort and motivation 2023-05-30T09:51:37Z 2023-05-30T09:51:37Z 2022 Artículo O, A. L. de la, González, L. I., Weitz Shapiro, R. Voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats [en línea]. World Development. 2023, 162. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.106131. Disponible en: https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/16417 0305-750X https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/16417 10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.106131 eng Acceso abierto. 24 meses de embargo http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Argentina Elsevier World Development. 2023, 162
institution Universidad Católica Argentina
institution_str I-33
repository_str R-139
collection Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA)
language Inglés
topic SUPERVISION
AUDITORIA
BUROCRACIA
TRABAJO DE CAMPO
ESCUELA PRIMARIA
spellingShingle SUPERVISION
AUDITORIA
BUROCRACIA
TRABAJO DE CAMPO
ESCUELA PRIMARIA
O, Ana L. de la
González, Lucas Isaac
Weitz Shapiro, Rebecca
Voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats
topic_facet SUPERVISION
AUDITORIA
BUROCRACIA
TRABAJO DE CAMPO
ESCUELA PRIMARIA
description Resumen: Can opportunities for undergoing voluntary oversight improve bureaucratic motivation and effort? Drawing on insights fromthe social sciences, we argue that voluntary oversight increases front-line bureaucrats’ sense of autonomy and competence, and may therefore increase their motivation and effort. Partnering with a provincial auditing body in Argentina, we implement an encouragement design in which school principals are invited to receive a voluntary audit of a publicly funded schoolmeal program.We employ a two-level randomization, in which regions are first randomly assigned to a higher or lower rate of invitations, and then schoolswithin regions are randomly assigned to treatment or control.We find divergent effects of treatment based onthe density of treatment; inthe groupof regions assigned to the lower rate of invitations, school principals assigned to treatment report increased motivation and a decrease in school closings. In contrast, in the group of regions assigned to the higher rate of invitations, we observe the opposite effect. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork, we speculate that a higher rate of invitationsmay generate pressure to accept the invitation and thereby undermine any positive effects of volunteering. Our results suggest the promise of voluntary audits as well as the need for further research on the conditions under which voluntary oversight may have differing consequences for bureaucratic effort and motivation
format Artículo
author O, Ana L. de la
González, Lucas Isaac
Weitz Shapiro, Rebecca
author_facet O, Ana L. de la
González, Lucas Isaac
Weitz Shapiro, Rebecca
author_sort O, Ana L. de la
title Voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats
title_short Voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats
title_full Voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats
title_fullStr Voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats
title_full_unstemmed Voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats
title_sort voluntary audits : experimental evidence on a new approach to monitoring front-line bureaucrats
publisher Elsevier
publishDate 2023
url https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/16417
work_keys_str_mv AT oanaldela voluntaryauditsexperimentalevidenceonanewapproachtomonitoringfrontlinebureaucrats
AT gonzalezlucasisaac voluntaryauditsexperimentalevidenceonanewapproachtomonitoringfrontlinebureaucrats
AT weitzshapirorebecca voluntaryauditsexperimentalevidenceonanewapproachtomonitoringfrontlinebureaucrats
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