The Causal Origin of Impossibility according to Henry of Ghent

A critical translation of two quodlibetal questions by Henry of Ghent on the causal origin of impossibility, preceded by a preliminary study that analyses both questions within the general framework of his relational ontology. In the first one (VI.3), Henry concludes that the impossibility of someth...

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Autor principal: Martínez Ruiz, Carlos
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2023
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Acceso en línea:http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/12939
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spelling I28-R260-article-129392023-08-29T20:43:49Z The Causal Origin of Impossibility according to Henry of Ghent El origen causal de la imposibilidad según Enrique de Gante Martínez Ruiz, Carlos Impossibility Ontology Modality Thing Nothingness Imposibilidad Ontología Modalidad Cosa Nada A critical translation of two quodlibetal questions by Henry of Ghent on the causal origin of impossibility, preceded by a preliminary study that analyses both questions within the general framework of his relational ontology. In the first one (VI.3), Henry concludes that the impossibility of something comes from the thing itself (ex parte rei); while in the second one (VIII.3), he holds that the impossibility of something comes from God (ex parte dei). The textual and philosophical analysis shows, on the one hand, the continuity and dependence of the second question on the first one, and, on the other hand, the weakness of the distinction between the formal constitution of the res and its objective possibility, as well as the originality and value of the notion of nothingness (purum nihil) proposed by Henry in both questions. Traducción crítica de las dos cuestiones quodlibetales dedicadas por Enrique de Gante al origen causal de la imposibilidad, precedida de un estudio introductorio que analiza ambas cuestiones en el marco general de su ontología relacional. En la primera (VI.3), Enrique concluye que la imposibilidad de algo proviene ex parte rei; mientras que en la segunda (VIII.3), concluye que la imposibilidad de algo proviene ex parte dei. El estudio de ambas cuestiones muestra, por una parte, la continuidad y la dependencia de la segunda cuestión respecto de la primera y, por otra, la debilidad de la distinción propuesta por Enrique entre la constitución formal de la res y su posibilidad objetiva, así como la originalidad y el valor de la noción de nada (purum nihil) que logra precisar en ellas. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2023-05-30 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/12939 10.34096/petm.v44.n1.12939 Patristica et Mediævalia; Vol. 44 Núm. 1 (2023); 93-114 2683-9636 0325-2280 spa http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/12939/11594
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-260
container_title_str Patristica et Mediævalia
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Impossibility
Ontology
Modality
Thing
Nothingness
Imposibilidad
Ontología
Modalidad
Cosa
Nada
spellingShingle Impossibility
Ontology
Modality
Thing
Nothingness
Imposibilidad
Ontología
Modalidad
Cosa
Nada
Martínez Ruiz, Carlos
The Causal Origin of Impossibility according to Henry of Ghent
topic_facet Impossibility
Ontology
Modality
Thing
Nothingness
Imposibilidad
Ontología
Modalidad
Cosa
Nada
author Martínez Ruiz, Carlos
author_facet Martínez Ruiz, Carlos
author_sort Martínez Ruiz, Carlos
title The Causal Origin of Impossibility according to Henry of Ghent
title_short The Causal Origin of Impossibility according to Henry of Ghent
title_full The Causal Origin of Impossibility according to Henry of Ghent
title_fullStr The Causal Origin of Impossibility according to Henry of Ghent
title_full_unstemmed The Causal Origin of Impossibility according to Henry of Ghent
title_sort causal origin of impossibility according to henry of ghent
description A critical translation of two quodlibetal questions by Henry of Ghent on the causal origin of impossibility, preceded by a preliminary study that analyses both questions within the general framework of his relational ontology. In the first one (VI.3), Henry concludes that the impossibility of something comes from the thing itself (ex parte rei); while in the second one (VIII.3), he holds that the impossibility of something comes from God (ex parte dei). The textual and philosophical analysis shows, on the one hand, the continuity and dependence of the second question on the first one, and, on the other hand, the weakness of the distinction between the formal constitution of the res and its objective possibility, as well as the originality and value of the notion of nothingness (purum nihil) proposed by Henry in both questions.
publisher Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
publishDate 2023
url http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/12939
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first_indexed 2023-07-10T23:08:23Z
last_indexed 2023-11-08T21:49:31Z
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