Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought

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This article is aimed to study Antonio Perez’s criticism against Peter Auriol’s theory of intentional identity. Pérez’s theory of cognition is clearly in debt with Auriol’s theory of intentionality. The Spanish Jesuit often uses the same linguistic expressions of Auriol (such as apparent being) and...

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Autor principal: Soliani, Gian Pietro
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2023
Materias:
Antonio Pérez
Peter Auriol
Intentionality
Theory of Cognition
Apparent Being
Pedro Auréolo
Intencionalidad
Teoría del conocimiento
Ser aparente
Acceso en línea:http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/11971
Aporte de:
Patristica et Mediævalia de Universidad de Buenos Aires
id I28-R260-article-11971
record_format ojs
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-260
container_title_str Patristica et Mediævalia
language Inglés
format Artículo revista
topic Antonio Pérez
Peter Auriol
Intentionality
Theory of Cognition
Apparent Being
Antonio Pérez
Pedro Auréolo
Intencionalidad
Teoría del conocimiento
Ser aparente
spellingShingle Antonio Pérez
Peter Auriol
Intentionality
Theory of Cognition
Apparent Being
Antonio Pérez
Pedro Auréolo
Intencionalidad
Teoría del conocimiento
Ser aparente
Soliani, Gian Pietro
Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
topic_facet Antonio Pérez
Peter Auriol
Intentionality
Theory of Cognition
Apparent Being
Antonio Pérez
Pedro Auréolo
Intencionalidad
Teoría del conocimiento
Ser aparente
author Soliani, Gian Pietro
author_facet Soliani, Gian Pietro
author_sort Soliani, Gian Pietro
title Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
title_short Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
title_full Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
title_fullStr Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
title_full_unstemmed Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought
title_sort antonio pérez (1599-1649) on intentional identity: a revisionism of peter auriol’s thought
description This article is aimed to study Antonio Perez’s criticism against Peter Auriol’s theory of intentional identity. Pérez’s theory of cognition is clearly in debt with Auriol’s theory of intentionality. The Spanish Jesuit often uses the same linguistic expressions of Auriol (such as apparent being) and agrees with him about the intentional identity between the cogniser –conciding in act with the act of cognition–, and the cognised object, which is the same thing existing outside the intellect. Both Pérez and Auriol ground their theory of intentional identity on Aristotle’s De anima, but the Spanish Jesuit highlights an inconsistency in Auriol’s doctrine which contradicts what succinctly stated by Aristotle about the identity between the cogniser and the cognised during the act of cognition. By reviewing in-depth Auriol’s theory of intentional identity, conceived as a kind of identity of indistinction, Pérez points out an inconsistency between Auriol’s description of the act of cognition and his conception of the identity of indistinction. Furthermore, Pérez seems to consider insufficient Auriol’s identity of indistinction used to describe the intentional identity characterising the act of cognition. Consequently, he offers a new definition of the identity of indistinction in order to present the apparent being as an undetermined reality which can be determined by any intelligible content. This Perezian review of Auriol’s theory of the apparent being, on the one hand, can be considered as a case of the early modern scholastic revisionism applied to a medieval thinker and, on the other hand, finds a wider application in Pérez’s metaphysics and philosophical anthropology.
publisher Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
publishDate 2023
url http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/11971
work_keys_str_mv AT solianigianpietro antonioperez15991649onintentionalidentityarevisionismofpeterauriolsthought
first_indexed 2023-07-10T23:08:21Z
last_indexed 2023-11-08T21:49:29Z
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spelling I28-R260-article-119712023-08-29T20:43:49Z Antonio Pérez (1599-1649) on Intentional Identity: A Revisionism of Peter Auriol’s Thought Soliani, Gian Pietro Antonio Pérez Peter Auriol Intentionality Theory of Cognition Apparent Being Antonio Pérez Pedro Auréolo Intencionalidad Teoría del conocimiento Ser aparente This article is aimed to study Antonio Perez’s criticism against Peter Auriol’s theory of intentional identity. Pérez’s theory of cognition is clearly in debt with Auriol’s theory of intentionality. The Spanish Jesuit often uses the same linguistic expressions of Auriol (such as apparent being) and agrees with him about the intentional identity between the cogniser –conciding in act with the act of cognition–, and the cognised object, which is the same thing existing outside the intellect. Both Pérez and Auriol ground their theory of intentional identity on Aristotle’s De anima, but the Spanish Jesuit highlights an inconsistency in Auriol’s doctrine which contradicts what succinctly stated by Aristotle about the identity between the cogniser and the cognised during the act of cognition. By reviewing in-depth Auriol’s theory of intentional identity, conceived as a kind of identity of indistinction, Pérez points out an inconsistency between Auriol’s description of the act of cognition and his conception of the identity of indistinction. Furthermore, Pérez seems to consider insufficient Auriol’s identity of indistinction used to describe the intentional identity characterising the act of cognition. Consequently, he offers a new definition of the identity of indistinction in order to present the apparent being as an undetermined reality which can be determined by any intelligible content. This Perezian review of Auriol’s theory of the apparent being, on the one hand, can be considered as a case of the early modern scholastic revisionism applied to a medieval thinker and, on the other hand, finds a wider application in Pérez’s metaphysics and philosophical anthropology. Este artículo pretende estudiar la crítica de Antonio Pérez a la teoría de la identidad intencional de Pedro Auréolo. La teoría de la cognición de Pérez es claramente deudora de la doctrina de la intencionalidad de Auréolo. El jesuita español utiliza a menudo las mismas expresiones lingüísticas que Auréolo (como "ser aparente") y coincide con él en la identidad intencional entre el conocedor -que coincide en acto con el acto de conocer- y el objeto conocido, que es lo mismo que existe fuera del intelecto. Tanto Pérez como Auréolo basan su teoría de la identidad intencional en el De anima de Aristóteles, pero el jesuita español señala una incoherencia en la doctrina de Auréolo, que contradice la concisa afirmación de Aristóteles sobre la identidad entre el conocedor y lo conocido durante el acto de conocimiento. Al examinar a fondo la teoría de la identidad intencional de Auréolo, concebida como una especie de identidad de indistinción, Pérez señala una incoherencia entre la descripción que hace Auréolo del acto de cognición y su concepción de la identidad de indistinción. Además, Pérez parece considerar insuficiente la identidad de indistinción de Auréolo utilizada para describir la identidad intencional que caracteriza el acto de cognición. En consecuencia, ofrece una nueva definición de identidad indistinta para presentar el ser aparente como una realidad indeterminada que puede ser determinada por cualquier contenido inteligible. Esta revisión péreziana de la teoría del ser aparente de Auréolo, por un lado, puede verse como un caso de revisionismo escolástico temprano moderno aplicado a un pensador medieval y, por otro, encuentra una aplicación más amplia en la metafísica y la antropología filosófica de Pérez. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2023-05-18 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/11971 10.34096/petm.v44.n1.11971 Patristica et Mediævalia; Vol. 44 Núm. 1 (2023); 49-69 2683-9636 0325-2280 eng http://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/11971/11592

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