6977
This essay analyzes the distinctive traits of the object and method of the legal discipline, from different legal-philosophical perspectives, in order to test whether it is a science, at least from the traditional epistemology standards (problem introduced in section I). Therefore, in the first plac...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | http://www.derecho.uba.ar/publicaciones/pensar-en-derecho/revistas/21/entre-artistas-cientificos-profetas.pdf http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=pensar&cl=CL1&d=HWA_6977 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/pensar/index/assoc/HWA_6977.dir/6977.PDF |
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| Sumario: | This essay analyzes the distinctive traits of the object and method of the legal discipline, from different legal-philosophical perspectives, in order to test whether it is a science, at least from the traditional epistemology standards (problem introduced in section I). Therefore, in the first place, the theoretical premises are established in relation to the requirements that any discipline must meet to produce "scientific knowledge" (section II). Then, the different philosophy of law schools' thesis are examined regarding what is the object of "law"/"jurisprudence" and whether they present epistemological objections, with special emphasis on the relationship between law and language in current regulatory systems (section III). Our next step is the study of the evolution of the legal interpretation theory -as the main method of this discipline, approached both by the theory of law and by the philosophy of law -, pointing out the different extra-normative factors that are used in judge's work (section IV). In the same way, I present which is the mission of the jurist, according to prominent doctrine, insofar as he seeks to establish himself as a "legal scientist" (section V). Once the inescapable link between law and morality as legal operator's tools has been affirmed, I set my metaethical premises and I investigate how these different knowledges are related in postmodern law (section VI). Finally, I conclude that law is not a science but a true power technique, with the consequent ethical, political and ideological responsibilities that this generates in the legal operator (section VII). |
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