Los derechos sociales y la perspectiva de la segunda persona

Abstract: The study of a person, a society, or a culture's comprehension is rooted in the philosophical hermeneutic ancient past, from Plato's dialogues to Aristoteles' treaties. Hume's Treatise of Human Nature established that empathy is essential to these purposes, to escape ou...

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Autor principal: Arceo, Tomás
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones 2019
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Acceso en línea:http://www.derecho.uba.ar/publicaciones/lye/revistas/103/los-derechos-sociales-y-la-perspectiva-de-la-segunda-persona.pdf
http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=pderecho/lecciones&cl=CL1&d=HWA_5560
http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/pderecho/lecciones/index/assoc/HWA_5560.dir/5560.PDF
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Sumario:Abstract: The study of a person, a society, or a culture's comprehension is rooted in the philosophical hermeneutic ancient past, from Plato's dialogues to Aristoteles' treaties. Hume's Treatise of Human Nature established that empathy is essential to these purposes, to escape our own interest and to comprehend the other person's perspective and interest. However, it is only with the studies of the 1970's that the theory of mental attribution had a renewed impetus, with the imputation of mental states to chimpanzees in laboratory research. Contemporary authors such as Quintanilla, Gomila or Scotto trace the second-person perspective of mental attribution, complimentary but exceeding the first (subjective) and third (objective), where the inter-subjective interaction becomes relevant. This work tries to apply the aforementioned concepts to the analysis of some rulings of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires' courts where the actors, to solve claims related to social rights, must perform a mental attribution of the subject.