La teoría interpretativa, el activismo judicial y los jueces Robin Hood : la culpa no es de Dworkin

Abstract: This essay aspires to elucidate some of the fundamental postulates of Ronald Dworkin's legal philosophy. In particular, the author argues that the thesis that law must always be interpreted does not imply that judges can manipulate the legal norms of their community in view of their o...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Montero, Julio
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones 2019
Materias:
Filosofia del derecho
Activismo judicial
El derecho como integridad
Positivismo juridico
Dworkin, Ronald
Imperio de la justicia
Practica judicial
Interpretacion de la ley
Interpretativismo
Practica social
Normas juridicas
Principios juridicos
Facultades discrecionales del juez
CSJN
Caso McLoughlin v O'Brian
Jurisprudencia
Sentencia F.A.L.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion
Philosophy of law
Law's empire
Judicial activism
Adjudication
Law as integrity
Legal positivism
Judicial practice
Interpretivism
McLoughlin v O'Brian case
Interpretation of the law
Social practice
Legal principles
Discretionary powers of the judge
Juriprudence
Case-law
Acceso en línea:http://www.derecho.uba.ar/publicaciones/lye/revistas/102/la-teoria-interpretativa-el-activismo-judicial-y-los-jueces-robin-hood.pdf
http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=pderecho/lecciones&cl=CL1&d=HWA_5501
http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/pderecho/lecciones/index/assoc/HWA_5501.dir/5501.PDF
Aporte de:
Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires
Descripción
Sumario:Abstract: This essay aspires to elucidate some of the fundamental postulates of Ronald Dworkin's legal philosophy. In particular, the author argues that the thesis that law must always be interpreted does not imply that judges can manipulate the legal norms of their community in view of their own conception of justice. The essay distinguishes between two conceptual layers, intimately related though different, that are constitutive of Dworkin's legal philosophy. The first one is his theory of law as an interpretive practice, whereas the second one relates to the specific interpretation of the legal practice he proposes: law as integrity. The thesis that law must always be interpreted pertains to the former layer rather than the latter. Instead, when it comes to enforcing the law, judges must use the adjudication technique included in law as integrity. Contrary to what is often assumed, this technique significantly reduces the margin of discretion of judges. The conclusion is that Dworkin's theory does not promote judicial activism -at least no more than other theoretical approaches to the legal practice.

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