El DIlEMA DE lA SINCERIDAD: lA CoNCEPCIÓN SUBJETIVA DE lA lIBERTAD...
According to the subjective conception of religious freedom, this right protects a person's moral agency. Therefore, the legal relevance of religious beliefs does not derive from their objective merits but, rather, from the instrumental value that individuals assign to them. Respect for this in...
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
| Publicado: |
Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones
2019
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=juridica&cl=CL1&d=HWA_3857 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/juridica/index/assoc/HWA_3857.dir/3857.PDF |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | According to the subjective conception of religious freedom, this right protects a person's moral agency. Therefore, the legal relevance of religious beliefs does not derive from their objective merits but, rather, from the instrumental value that individuals assign to them. Respect for this individual right to freely choose one's own conception of the good imposes limits on the judicial evaluation of the beliefs that underlie a claim alleging a violation of the right to religious freedom. Nevertheless, by observing said limits, judges lose access to the epistemological means that they need in order to determine whether a person is sincere. The impossibility of undertaking this sincerity test, for its part, calls into question the sustainability of a conscientious objection regime. The judicial ability to perform this inquiry requires adopting an objective point of view regarding persons' religious beliefs. But this would mean to abandon the subjective conception of religious freedom. |
|---|