Positivismo jurídico: dejen que herede Palmer
In this article the author offers us some reconsiderations of the\nold philosophical dispute between Dworkin and Hart, from the perspective of the judgement in Riggs v. Palmer. Firstly, the author makes a brief historical review of the evolution of the two main schools of thought of philosophy of la...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones
2014
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| Acceso en línea: | http://www.derecho.uba.ar/publicaciones/lye/revistas/93/positivismo-juridico-dejen-que-herede-palmer.pdf http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=revis&cl=CL1&d=HWA_1183 http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/pderecho/lecciones/index/assoc/HWA_1183.dir/1183.PDF |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | In this article the author offers us some reconsiderations of the\nold philosophical dispute between Dworkin and Hart, from the perspective of the judgement in Riggs v. Palmer. Firstly, the author makes a brief historical review of the evolution of the two main schools of thought of philosophy of law (legal positivism and natural law). Secondly, the author reviews the most important arguments of Dworkin against legal positivism. Thirdly, the author analyzes the positivist reply of Hart and Carrió. Finally, the author offers us a new position regarding the theoretical differences between these philosophers |
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