La salud mental (en la Argentina) : dos paradigmas en pugna
In this paper, a critical analysis of the ?disability? concept in the Argentine\ncivil law is made in light of new paradigms within the mental health context which\ntend to re-establish these individuals? (wrongly called the ?handicapped? or ?disabled?)\ndignity and autonomy, it being understood tha...
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Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones
2012
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Acceso en línea: | http://www.derecho.uba.ar/publicaciones/lye/revistas/90/croxatto.pdf http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=revis&cl=CL1&d=HWA_1035 http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/pderecho/lecciones/index/assoc/HWA_1035.dir/1035.PDF |
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Universidad de Buenos Aires |
institution_str |
I-28 |
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R-145 |
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Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) |
language |
Español |
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spa |
topic |
Discapacidad. Derechos humanos Salud mental Modelo social Dignidad Autonomía Disability Human rights Mental health Social model Dignity Autonomy |
spellingShingle |
Discapacidad. Derechos humanos Salud mental Modelo social Dignidad Autonomía Disability Human rights Mental health Social model Dignity Autonomy Croxatto, Guido Leonardo La salud mental (en la Argentina) : dos paradigmas en pugna |
topic_facet |
Discapacidad. Derechos humanos Salud mental Modelo social Dignidad Autonomía Disability Human rights Mental health Social model Dignity Autonomy |
description |
In this paper, a critical analysis of the ?disability? concept in the Argentine\ncivil law is made in light of new paradigms within the mental health context which\ntend to re-establish these individuals? (wrongly called the ?handicapped? or ?disabled?)\ndignity and autonomy, it being understood that the disability is more than an\nillness or limitation of the individual (as usually considered); it is a barrier outlined\nby society itself which then, through the law, disables the individual (declares them\ndisabled). It will be held that the disability embodies a legal contradiction. Within\nthis context, a proposal for change is analysed from a new social model (replacing the\nprotective model of the Argentine Civil Code, which has shown that ?protection? is\na vertical model which tends to silence and isolate those who most need to be heard)\nfocused on the full respect for the dignity and autonomy of the individuals resorting to\nmental health services. The role of the temporary guardian in mental disability proceedings\nis analysed, posing the question of whether they should act as the lawyer of such\nindividuals (Kraut) or as an assistant to the judge (Llambías), emphasizing in said cases\nthe vertical (protective) nature of these procedures (which put the legal proceedings\non an equal footing with part of the medical treatment) and, as a result, the isolation\nand muting of the individual who most needs to be heard during the legal proceedings:\nthe alleged ?disabled?. The conclusion is that the civil law must abandon the disability\nconcept because by making individuals disabled it has not ?protected? or ?recovered?\nthe ?disabled?, it has rather isolated, silenced, killed and annulled them as individuals\n(many times, only to protect property). For the law there can no longer be disabled or\nhandicapped people. Only people. It will be demonstrated that the disability concept is\nincompatible with a human rights-based approach |
format |
Artículo Artículo publishedVersion |
author |
Croxatto, Guido Leonardo |
author_facet |
Croxatto, Guido Leonardo |
author_sort |
Croxatto, Guido Leonardo |
title |
La salud mental (en la Argentina) : dos paradigmas en pugna |
title_short |
La salud mental (en la Argentina) : dos paradigmas en pugna |
title_full |
La salud mental (en la Argentina) : dos paradigmas en pugna |
title_fullStr |
La salud mental (en la Argentina) : dos paradigmas en pugna |
title_full_unstemmed |
La salud mental (en la Argentina) : dos paradigmas en pugna |
title_sort |
la salud mental (en la argentina) : dos paradigmas en pugna |
publisher |
Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://www.derecho.uba.ar/publicaciones/lye/revistas/90/croxatto.pdf http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=revis&cl=CL1&d=HWA_1035 http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/pderecho/lecciones/index/assoc/HWA_1035.dir/1035.PDF |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT croxattoguidoleonardo lasaludmentalenlaargentinadosparadigmasenpugna |
_version_ |
1766022462548475904 |
spelling |
I28-R145-HWA_10352016-08-30 In this paper, a critical analysis of the ?disability? concept in the Argentine\ncivil law is made in light of new paradigms within the mental health context which\ntend to re-establish these individuals? (wrongly called the ?handicapped? or ?disabled?)\ndignity and autonomy, it being understood that the disability is more than an\nillness or limitation of the individual (as usually considered); it is a barrier outlined\nby society itself which then, through the law, disables the individual (declares them\ndisabled). It will be held that the disability embodies a legal contradiction. Within\nthis context, a proposal for change is analysed from a new social model (replacing the\nprotective model of the Argentine Civil Code, which has shown that ?protection? is\na vertical model which tends to silence and isolate those who most need to be heard)\nfocused on the full respect for the dignity and autonomy of the individuals resorting to\nmental health services. The role of the temporary guardian in mental disability proceedings\nis analysed, posing the question of whether they should act as the lawyer of such\nindividuals (Kraut) or as an assistant to the judge (Llambías), emphasizing in said cases\nthe vertical (protective) nature of these procedures (which put the legal proceedings\non an equal footing with part of the medical treatment) and, as a result, the isolation\nand muting of the individual who most needs to be heard during the legal proceedings:\nthe alleged ?disabled?. The conclusion is that the civil law must abandon the disability\nconcept because by making individuals disabled it has not ?protected? or ?recovered?\nthe ?disabled?, it has rather isolated, silenced, killed and annulled them as individuals\n(many times, only to protect property). For the law there can no longer be disabled or\nhandicapped people. Only people. It will be demonstrated that the disability concept is\nincompatible with a human rights-based approach Fil: Croxatto, Guido Leonardo. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho; Argentina Fil: Croxatto, Guido Leonardo. Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos de la Nación. Secretaría de Derechos Humanos; Argentina Argentina Croxatto, Guido Leonardo 2012 En el presente trabajo se analiza una relectura crítica de la institución de\nla ?discapacidad? en el Derecho Civil argentino a la luz de los nuevos paradigmas en\nmateria de salud mental que tienden a restablecer a los sujetos (mal llamados ?discapacitados\no ?incapaces?) en su dignidad y su autonomía, entendiendo que la discapacidad\nmás que una enfermedad o limitación de la persona, (como a menudo se la ha visto)\nes una barrera que traza la misma sociedad que luego, a través del derecho, discapacita\n(declara discapacitada) a la persona. Se sostendrá que la discapacidad encarna\nuna contradicción del derecho. En este marco, se analiza una propuesta de cambio a\npartir de un nuevo modelo social (en reemplazo del modelo tutelar del Código Civil\nargentino, que ha demostrado que la ?tutela? es un modelo vertical que tiende a silenciar\ny aislar a quienes más necesitan ser escuchados) que pone en el centro el pleno\nrespeto de la dignidad y de la autonomía de las personas usuarias de servicios de salud\nmental. Se analiza el rol del curador provisorio en los juicios de insania, planteando\nel interrogante de si debe actuar como un abogado de la persona (Kraut) o como un\nauxiliar del juez (Llambías), acentuando en esos casos el carácter vertical (tutelar) de\nestos procesos (que asimilan el proceso jurídico a una parte del tratamiento médico)\ny en consecuencia, el aislamiento y el silenciamiento de la persona que más necesita\nser escuchada durante el proceso judicial: el presunto ?incapaz?. La conclusión es que\nel Derecho Civil debe abandonar la figura de la discapacidad porque discapacitando\nno ha ?protegido? ni ?recuperado? a los ?incapaces?, sino que los ha aislado, silenciado,\nmatado y anulando como personas (muchas veces, al solo efecto de resguardar\nun patrimonio). Para el derecho ya no puede haber discapacitados ni incapaces. Solo\npersonas. Se demostrará que la discapacidad es una institución incompatible con un\nenfoque de derechos humanos application/pdf 0024-0079 http://www.derecho.uba.ar/publicaciones/lye/revistas/90/croxatto.pdf Discapacidad. Derechos humanos Salud mental Modelo social Dignidad Autonomía Disability Human rights Mental health Social model Dignity Autonomy spa Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ Lecciones y Ensayos, no. 90 La salud mental (en la Argentina) : dos paradigmas en pugna info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=revis&cl=CL1&d=HWA_1035 http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/pderecho/lecciones/index/assoc/HWA_1035.dir/1035.PDF |