Justification of human rights: a view from metaethics and the possibility of a non-cognitivist approach

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In this paper we aim to carry out a review of the concept of agency in two contemporary accounts of the foundation of human rights, in order to show some defects of the naturalistic approach and also to establish the basis for an alternative ground, from a non-cognitivist approach. Thus, we believe...

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Autor principal: Flores, María Fernanda
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2019
Materias:
agency
foundationalism
human rights
justification
naturalism
non-cognitivism
agencia
derechos humanos
fundacionismo
justificación
naturalismo
no cognitivismo
Acceso en línea:https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/9717
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=9717_oai
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Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires

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