Justification of human rights: a view from metaethics and the possibility of a non-cognitivist approach
In this paper we aim to carry out a review of the concept of agency in two contemporary accounts of the foundation of human rights, in order to show some defects of the naturalistic approach and also to establish the basis for an alternative ground, from a non-cognitivist approach. Thus, we believe...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2019
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/9717 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=9717_oai |
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I28-R145-9717_oai2025-11-17 Flores, María Fernanda 2019-11-01 In this paper we aim to carry out a review of the concept of agency in two contemporary accounts of the foundation of human rights, in order to show some defects of the naturalistic approach and also to establish the basis for an alternative ground, from a non-cognitivist approach. Thus, we believe it is necessary to determine to what extent the concept of agent took the naturalistic idea of attributing human rights only by virtue of characterically human features. Our thesis claims that this interpretation turns unclear some elements of the contemporary accounts, which can be better understood by means of moral epistemology and metaethics. El presente artículo tiene como objetivo llevar a cabo una revisión del concepto de agencia en dos propuestas actuales de fundamentación de los derechos humanos, con el fin de mostrar las falencias de la concepción naturalista y sentar las bases para una fundamentación alternativa, desde un enfoque no cognitivista. Para ello consideramos que es preciso determinar en qué medida el concepto de agente retoma la idea naturalista de la atribución de derechos en virtud de los rasgos propiamente humanos. Nuestra hipótesis es que esta interpretación opaca algunos elementos de las teorías contemporáneas que pueden ser dilucidados a la luz de la epistemología moral y la metaética. application/pdf https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/9717 10.34096/cf.n73.9717 spa Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/9717/8557 Cuadernos de filosofía; Núm. 73 (2019); 55-65 2362-485X 0590-1901 agency foundationalism human rights justification naturalism non-cognitivism agencia derechos humanos fundacionismo justificación naturalismo no cognitivismo Justification of human rights: a view from metaethics and the possibility of a non-cognitivist approach Justificación de los derechos humanos: una mirada desde la metaética y la posibilidad de un enfoque no cognitivista info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=9717_oai |
| institution |
Universidad de Buenos Aires |
| institution_str |
I-28 |
| repository_str |
R-145 |
| collection |
Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) |
| language |
Español |
| orig_language_str_mv |
spa |
| topic |
agency foundationalism human rights justification naturalism non-cognitivism agencia derechos humanos fundacionismo justificación naturalismo no cognitivismo |
| spellingShingle |
agency foundationalism human rights justification naturalism non-cognitivism agencia derechos humanos fundacionismo justificación naturalismo no cognitivismo Flores, María Fernanda Justification of human rights: a view from metaethics and the possibility of a non-cognitivist approach |
| topic_facet |
agency foundationalism human rights justification naturalism non-cognitivism agencia derechos humanos fundacionismo justificación naturalismo no cognitivismo |
| description |
In this paper we aim to carry out a review of the concept of agency in two contemporary accounts of the foundation of human rights, in order to show some defects of the naturalistic approach and also to establish the basis for an alternative ground, from a non-cognitivist approach. Thus, we believe it is necessary to determine to what extent the concept of agent took the naturalistic idea of attributing human rights only by virtue of characterically human features. Our thesis claims that this interpretation turns unclear some elements of the contemporary accounts, which can be better understood by means of moral epistemology and metaethics. |
| format |
Artículo publishedVersion |
| author |
Flores, María Fernanda |
| author_facet |
Flores, María Fernanda |
| author_sort |
Flores, María Fernanda |
| title |
Justification of human rights: a view from metaethics and the possibility of a non-cognitivist approach |
| title_short |
Justification of human rights: a view from metaethics and the possibility of a non-cognitivist approach |
| title_full |
Justification of human rights: a view from metaethics and the possibility of a non-cognitivist approach |
| title_fullStr |
Justification of human rights: a view from metaethics and the possibility of a non-cognitivist approach |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Justification of human rights: a view from metaethics and the possibility of a non-cognitivist approach |
| title_sort |
justification of human rights: a view from metaethics and the possibility of a non-cognitivist approach |
| publisher |
Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| url |
https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/9717 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=9717_oai |
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AT floresmariafernanda justificationofhumanrightsaviewfrommetaethicsandthepossibilityofanoncognitivistapproach AT floresmariafernanda justificaciondelosderechoshumanosunamiradadesdelametaeticaylaposibilidaddeunenfoquenocognitivista |
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1851375865277972480 |