Thomas Aquinas and the "Conditions Of Possibility" of a Natural Science: the Efficiency of Second Causes

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In Summa contra gentiles III 69, Thomas Aquinas engages in a polemic with a group of authors that have in common the fact that they “subtract their proper actions from natural things”, and among which we find some Muslim theologians (Mutakallims), Avicebron and Avicenna. In all of them we recognize...

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Autor principal: Castello Dubra, Julio A.
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2006
Materias:
Física
causas segundas
agencia de la causa
conocimiento de la naturaleza
Tomás de Aquino
Physics
secondary causes
agency of the cause
nature knowledge
Thomas Aquinas
Acceso en línea:https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7836
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=7836_oai
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spelling I28-R145-7836_oai2025-11-17 Castello Dubra, Julio A. 2006-06-05 In Summa contra gentiles III 69, Thomas Aquinas engages in a polemic with a group of authors that have in common the fact that they “subtract their proper actions from natural things”, and among which we find some Muslim theologians (Mutakallims), Avicebron and Avicenna. In all of them we recognize a general tendency to attribute every causal power to God, to the extent that no margin of action at all is left to corporeal beings. The general principle underlying these doctrines is that what is active is spiritual and immaterial; correlatively, what is corporeal and material is regarded as rather passive. Among the inconveniences or difficulties derived from these doctrines, Aquinas points out some arguments that depart from the regularity of the world of experience and from the features of our knowledge of nature. In this theological polemic against Occasionalism and Neoplatonism, Aquinas elaborates a discourse on the “conditions of possibility” of the natural science –that is to say, the Aristotelian physics–. All this shows that Thomas tries to draw, by means of a philosophical synthesis of different sources, a creationist metaphysics compatible with the Aristotelian philosophy of nature. En Summa contra gentiles III 69, Tomás de Aquino comienza una polémica con un grupo de autores que tienen en común el hecho de que “sustraen sus propias acciones de las cosas naturales”, entre ellos encontramos a algunos teólogos musulmanes (Mutakallims), Avicebron y Avicena. En todos ellos reconocemos una tendencia general a atribuir todo poder causal a Dios, al punto que no queda ningún margen de acción para los seres corpóreos. El principio general que subyace a estas doctrinas es aquel que sostiene que lo que es activo, es espiritual e inmaterial; correlativamente, lo que es corpóreo y material es entendido como más bien pasivo. Entre los inconvenientes o dificultades que derivan de estas doctrinas, Tomás señala algunos argumentos que parten de la regularidad del mundo de la experiencia y de las notas de nuestro conocimiento de la naturaleza. En esta polémica teológica contra el Ocasionalismo y el Neoplatonismo, Tomás elabora un discurso sobre las “condiciones de posibilidad” de la ciencia natural –esto es, sobre la física aristotélica–. Todo esto muestra que Tomás trata de delinear, a través de la síntesis filosóficas de fuertes diversas, una metafísica creacionista compatible con la filosofía aristotélica de la naturaleza. application/pdf https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7836 spa Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7836/6897 Patristica et Mediævalia; Vol. 27 (2006); 73-86 2683-9636 Física causas segundas agencia de la causa conocimiento de la naturaleza Tomás de Aquino Physics secondary causes agency of the cause nature knowledge Thomas Aquinas Thomas Aquinas and the "Conditions Of Possibility" of a Natural Science: the Efficiency of Second Causes Tomás de Aquino y las “condiciones de posibilidad” de una ciencia natural: la eficiencia de las causas segundas info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=7836_oai
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-145
collection Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
language Español
orig_language_str_mv spa
topic Física
causas segundas
agencia de la causa
conocimiento de la naturaleza
Tomás de Aquino
Physics
secondary causes
agency of the cause
nature knowledge
Thomas Aquinas
spellingShingle Física
causas segundas
agencia de la causa
conocimiento de la naturaleza
Tomás de Aquino
Physics
secondary causes
agency of the cause
nature knowledge
Thomas Aquinas
Castello Dubra, Julio A.
Thomas Aquinas and the "Conditions Of Possibility" of a Natural Science: the Efficiency of Second Causes
topic_facet Física
causas segundas
agencia de la causa
conocimiento de la naturaleza
Tomás de Aquino
Physics
secondary causes
agency of the cause
nature knowledge
Thomas Aquinas
description In Summa contra gentiles III 69, Thomas Aquinas engages in a polemic with a group of authors that have in common the fact that they “subtract their proper actions from natural things”, and among which we find some Muslim theologians (Mutakallims), Avicebron and Avicenna. In all of them we recognize a general tendency to attribute every causal power to God, to the extent that no margin of action at all is left to corporeal beings. The general principle underlying these doctrines is that what is active is spiritual and immaterial; correlatively, what is corporeal and material is regarded as rather passive. Among the inconveniences or difficulties derived from these doctrines, Aquinas points out some arguments that depart from the regularity of the world of experience and from the features of our knowledge of nature. In this theological polemic against Occasionalism and Neoplatonism, Aquinas elaborates a discourse on the “conditions of possibility” of the natural science –that is to say, the Aristotelian physics–. All this shows that Thomas tries to draw, by means of a philosophical synthesis of different sources, a creationist metaphysics compatible with the Aristotelian philosophy of nature.
format Artículo
publishedVersion
author Castello Dubra, Julio A.
author_facet Castello Dubra, Julio A.
author_sort Castello Dubra, Julio A.
title Thomas Aquinas and the "Conditions Of Possibility" of a Natural Science: the Efficiency of Second Causes
title_short Thomas Aquinas and the "Conditions Of Possibility" of a Natural Science: the Efficiency of Second Causes
title_full Thomas Aquinas and the "Conditions Of Possibility" of a Natural Science: the Efficiency of Second Causes
title_fullStr Thomas Aquinas and the "Conditions Of Possibility" of a Natural Science: the Efficiency of Second Causes
title_full_unstemmed Thomas Aquinas and the "Conditions Of Possibility" of a Natural Science: the Efficiency of Second Causes
title_sort thomas aquinas and the "conditions of possibility" of a natural science: the efficiency of second causes
publisher Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
publishDate 2006
url https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7836
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