The role of appetites in Thomas Aquinas's theory of sensitive knowledge
There is a principle in the thinking of Thomas Aquinas that maintains that every cognitive act is intentional. This principle is problematic in the field of sensitive knowledge because it contrasts with the idea that the senses are totally passive and that sensitive objects are the sufficient cause...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7640 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=7640_oai |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | There is a principle in the thinking of Thomas Aquinas that maintains that every cognitive act is intentional. This principle is problematic in the field of sensitive knowledge because it contrasts with the idea that the senses are totally passive and that sensitive objects are the sufficient cause of perception. The synergy of these theses generates two kinds of conflicts: 1) between the passivity of the senses and their act of addressing objects; 2) between the need for directionality to knowledge and the sufficiency of sensitive objects to cause perception. The apparent inconsistency in which the Aquinate would fall can be resolved by analyzing the role that corresponds to intellectual, sensitive and natural appetites in his theory of sensitive knowledge. |
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