The role of appetites in Thomas Aquinas's theory of sensitive knowledge

There is a principle in the thinking of Thomas Aquinas that maintains that every cognitive act is intentional. This principle is problematic in the field of sensitive knowledge because it contrasts with the idea that the senses are totally passive and that sensitive objects are the sufficient cause...

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Autor principal: Hernández, Fernando Gabriel
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2020
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Acceso en línea:https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7640
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=7640_oai
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spelling I28-R145-7640_oai2025-11-17 Hernández, Fernando Gabriel 2020-10-02 There is a principle in the thinking of Thomas Aquinas that maintains that every cognitive act is intentional. This principle is problematic in the field of sensitive knowledge because it contrasts with the idea that the senses are totally passive and that sensitive objects are the sufficient cause of perception. The synergy of these theses generates two kinds of conflicts: 1) between the passivity of the senses and their act of addressing objects; 2) between the need for directionality to knowledge and the sufficiency of sensitive objects to cause perception. The apparent inconsistency in which the Aquinate would fall can be resolved by analyzing the role that corresponds to intellectual, sensitive and natural appetites in his theory of sensitive knowledge. Existe un principio en el pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino que sostiene que todo acto cognoscitivo es intencional. Este principio resulta problemático en el ámbito del conocimiento sensitivo porque contrasta con la idea de que los sentidos son totalmente pasivos y los objetos sensibles son causa suficiente de la percepción. La sinergia de estas tesis genera, al menos, dos conflictos: 1) entre la pasividad de los sentidos y su acción de dirigirse a los objetos; 2) entre la necesidad de la direccionalidad para conocer y la suficiencia de los objetos sensibles para causar la percepción. La aparente inconsistencia en la que caería el Aquinate puede resolverse analizando el rol que cumplen los apetitos intelectual, sensitivo y natural en su teoría del conocimiento sensitivo. application/pdf text/html https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7640 10.34096/petm.v41.n1.7640 spa Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7640/7525 https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7640/7532 Patristica et Mediævalia; Vol. 41 Núm. 1 (2020); 23-40 2683-9636 Tomás de Aquino intencionalidad conocimiento sensitivo apetitos intención Thomas Aquinas intentionality sensitive knowledge appetites intention The role of appetites in Thomas Aquinas's theory of sensitive knowledge La función de los apetitos en la teoría del conocimiento sensitivo de Tomás de Aquino info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=7640_oai
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-145
collection Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
language Español
orig_language_str_mv spa
topic Tomás de Aquino
intencionalidad
conocimiento sensitivo
apetitos
intención
Thomas Aquinas
intentionality
sensitive knowledge
appetites
intention
spellingShingle Tomás de Aquino
intencionalidad
conocimiento sensitivo
apetitos
intención
Thomas Aquinas
intentionality
sensitive knowledge
appetites
intention
Hernández, Fernando Gabriel
The role of appetites in Thomas Aquinas's theory of sensitive knowledge
topic_facet Tomás de Aquino
intencionalidad
conocimiento sensitivo
apetitos
intención
Thomas Aquinas
intentionality
sensitive knowledge
appetites
intention
description There is a principle in the thinking of Thomas Aquinas that maintains that every cognitive act is intentional. This principle is problematic in the field of sensitive knowledge because it contrasts with the idea that the senses are totally passive and that sensitive objects are the sufficient cause of perception. The synergy of these theses generates two kinds of conflicts: 1) between the passivity of the senses and their act of addressing objects; 2) between the need for directionality to knowledge and the sufficiency of sensitive objects to cause perception. The apparent inconsistency in which the Aquinate would fall can be resolved by analyzing the role that corresponds to intellectual, sensitive and natural appetites in his theory of sensitive knowledge.
format Artículo
publishedVersion
author Hernández, Fernando Gabriel
author_facet Hernández, Fernando Gabriel
author_sort Hernández, Fernando Gabriel
title The role of appetites in Thomas Aquinas's theory of sensitive knowledge
title_short The role of appetites in Thomas Aquinas's theory of sensitive knowledge
title_full The role of appetites in Thomas Aquinas's theory of sensitive knowledge
title_fullStr The role of appetites in Thomas Aquinas's theory of sensitive knowledge
title_full_unstemmed The role of appetites in Thomas Aquinas's theory of sensitive knowledge
title_sort role of appetites in thomas aquinas's theory of sensitive knowledge
publisher Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
publishDate 2020
url https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7640
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=7640_oai
work_keys_str_mv AT hernandezfernandogabriel theroleofappetitesinthomasaquinasstheoryofsensitiveknowledge
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