Luis de Molina on Rights as Limits for Legislation
Luis de Molina's Concept of Law shows similarities with aspects of R. Dworkin's Thought. In general, Modern discourse is useful for a proper analysis of Molina's rights-based legal theory, which, in turn, proves to be Modern. Thus, some elements of the present rights debate, for examp...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2017
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7381 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=7381_oai |
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| Sumario: | Luis de Molina's Concept of Law shows similarities with aspects of R. Dworkin's Thought. In general, Modern discourse is useful for a proper analysis of Molina's rights-based legal theory, which, in turn, proves to be Modern. Thus, some elements of the present rights debate, for example between election theorists and interest theorists, are discussed with reference to Molina by showing how he uses ius in the sense of law as the basis of his legal theory. A central role is given to the concept of dominium, which helps to clarify what rights human beings can have and where their limits lie. At the same time, the way Molina uses that term also limits the power of human authorities over individuals, without claiming a human right to inalienable freedom: a person's freedom belongs to his dominium, so he can sell himself as a slave in certain circumstances. |
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