Luis de Molina on Rights as Limits for Legislation

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Luis de Molina's Concept of Law shows similarities with aspects of R. Dworkin's Thought. In general, Modern discourse is useful for a proper analysis of Molina's rights-based legal theory, which, in turn, proves to be Modern. Thus, some elements of the present rights debate, for examp...

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Autor principal:	Kaufmann, Matthias
Formato:	Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:	Inglés
Publicado:	Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2017
Materias:	Luis de Molina Dworkin dominium libertad derechos Dominium Freedom Rights
Acceso en línea:	https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7381 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=7381_oai
Aporte de:	Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires

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spelling	I28-R145-7381_oai2025-11-17 Kaufmann, Matthias 2017-09-01 Luis de Molina's Concept of Law shows similarities with aspects of R. Dworkin's Thought. In general, Modern discourse is useful for a proper analysis of Molina's rights-based legal theory, which, in turn, proves to be Modern. Thus, some elements of the present rights debate, for example between election theorists and interest theorists, are discussed with reference to Molina by showing how he uses ius in the sense of law as the basis of his legal theory. A central role is given to the concept of dominium, which helps to clarify what rights human beings can have and where their limits lie. At the same time, the way Molina uses that term also limits the power of human authorities over individuals, without claiming a human right to inalienable freedom: a person's freedom belongs to his dominium, so he can sell himself as a slave in certain circumstances. El concepto de derecho de Luis de Molina muestra semejanzas con aspectos del pensamiento de R. Dworkin. En general, el discurso moderno es útil para realizar un análisis adecuado de la teoría legal basada en derechos de Molina, la cual, a su vez, se revela como moderna. Por ello algunos elementos del debate presente sobre derechos, por ejemplo entre teóricos de la elección y teóricos del interés, son discutidos con referencia a Molina demostrando de qué modo él hace uso del ius en el sentido de derecho como base de su teoría legal. Un papel central se otorga al concepto de dominium, que ayuda a clarificar qué derechos pueden tener los seres humanos y dónde están sus límites. Al mismo tiempo, la manera como Molina usa ese término también limita el poder de las autoridades humanas sobre individuos, sin reivindicar un derecho humano a la libertad inalienable: la libertad de una persona pertenece a su dominium, por lo tanto ella puede venderse a sí misma como esclava en ciertas circunstancias. application/pdf https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7381 eng Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7381/6633 Patristica et Mediævalia; Vol. 38 (2017); 19-32 2683-9636 Luis de Molina Dworkin dominium libertad derechos Luis de Molina Dworkin Dominium Freedom Rights Luis de Molina on Rights as Limits for Legislation info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=7381_oai
institution	Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str	I-28
repository_str	R-145
collection	Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
language	Inglés
orig_language_str_mv	eng
topic	Luis de Molina Dworkin dominium libertad derechos Luis de Molina Dworkin Dominium Freedom Rights
spellingShingle	Luis de Molina Dworkin dominium libertad derechos Luis de Molina Dworkin Dominium Freedom Rights Kaufmann, Matthias Luis de Molina on Rights as Limits for Legislation
topic_facet	Luis de Molina Dworkin dominium libertad derechos Luis de Molina Dworkin Dominium Freedom Rights
description	Luis de Molina's Concept of Law shows similarities with aspects of R. Dworkin's Thought. In general, Modern discourse is useful for a proper analysis of Molina's rights-based legal theory, which, in turn, proves to be Modern. Thus, some elements of the present rights debate, for example between election theorists and interest theorists, are discussed with reference to Molina by showing how he uses ius in the sense of law as the basis of his legal theory. A central role is given to the concept of dominium, which helps to clarify what rights human beings can have and where their limits lie. At the same time, the way Molina uses that term also limits the power of human authorities over individuals, without claiming a human right to inalienable freedom: a person's freedom belongs to his dominium, so he can sell himself as a slave in certain circumstances.
format	Artículo publishedVersion
author	Kaufmann, Matthias
author_facet	Kaufmann, Matthias
author_sort	Kaufmann, Matthias
title	Luis de Molina on Rights as Limits for Legislation
title_short	Luis de Molina on Rights as Limits for Legislation
title_full	Luis de Molina on Rights as Limits for Legislation
title_fullStr	Luis de Molina on Rights as Limits for Legislation
title_full_unstemmed	Luis de Molina on Rights as Limits for Legislation
title_sort	luis de molina on rights as limits for legislation
publisher	Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
publishDate	2017
url	https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/7381 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=7381_oai
work_keys_str_mv	AT kaufmannmatthias luisdemolinaonrightsaslimitsforlegislation
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Luis de Molina on Rights as Limits for Legislation

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