Soul’s forge: Porphyry’s criticism to the Stoic embryology

According to the Stoic embryology, the embryo is still nature, that is, it has the life assigned to plants, not to animals. The Stoic Hierocles points out that the soul “exceeds” nature because it has two psychic powers –impulse and sensation- absent in nature (Elementa Ethica 1.5-35; BS 13.9; LS53B...

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Autor principal: Zamora Calvo, José M.
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2015
Acceso en línea:https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/3480
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=3480_oai
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description According to the Stoic embryology, the embryo is still nature, that is, it has the life assigned to plants, not to animals. The Stoic Hierocles points out that the soul “exceeds” nature because it has two psychic powers –impulse and sensation- absent in nature (Elementa Ethica 1.5-35; BS 13.9; LS53B) .The embryo, therefore, as plants, has no sensation, presentation and impulse. Indeed, Stoics believe that the embryo lacks impulse, but their argument is more difficult to defend with respect to the lack of sensation. Porphyry, in his Ad Gaurum, deals with the question of how the embryo receives the soul, subject in which he confronts with the Stoic thesis. The entrance or incorporation of the soul into the body, identified with the embryo, takes place from the outside (ἔξωθεν). Porphyry refers to Aristotle (De anima 2.5.417a5-9), when he explains that the soul has no perception in the absence of external objects, as well as fuel can not ignite isolated as it needs external fire. Plotinus’ disciple takes the Aristotelian analogy between perception and inflammation, again, but states that the latter can arise without fire in contact with fuel. The nature that governs the embryo starts moving and becomes soul, adapting itself to the environment, as if tempered by the cold air outside. In his treatise Ad Gaurum (14.4.23-29), Porphyry criticizes this Stoic theory about the “tempering of the embryo”, that it can be put in connection with the embryological view expressed in Elementha Ethica of Hierocles. This testimony, where Chryssipus name is mentioned and not included in editions and translations of Stoic texts (nor in the SVF neither in the recent collection of Boeri-Salles), seems to us that provides relevant elements. 
format Artículo
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author Zamora Calvo, José M.
spellingShingle Zamora Calvo, José M.
Soul’s forge: Porphyry’s criticism to the Stoic embryology
author_facet Zamora Calvo, José M.
author_sort Zamora Calvo, José M.
title Soul’s forge: Porphyry’s criticism to the Stoic embryology
title_short Soul’s forge: Porphyry’s criticism to the Stoic embryology
title_full Soul’s forge: Porphyry’s criticism to the Stoic embryology
title_fullStr Soul’s forge: Porphyry’s criticism to the Stoic embryology
title_full_unstemmed Soul’s forge: Porphyry’s criticism to the Stoic embryology
title_sort soul’s forge: porphyry’s criticism to the stoic embryology
publisher Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
publishDate 2015
url https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/3480
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spelling I28-R145-3480_oai2025-11-17 Zamora Calvo, José M. 2015-05-10 According to the Stoic embryology, the embryo is still nature, that is, it has the life assigned to plants, not to animals. The Stoic Hierocles points out that the soul “exceeds” nature because it has two psychic powers –impulse and sensation- absent in nature (Elementa Ethica 1.5-35; BS 13.9; LS53B) .The embryo, therefore, as plants, has no sensation, presentation and impulse. Indeed, Stoics believe that the embryo lacks impulse, but their argument is more difficult to defend with respect to the lack of sensation. Porphyry, in his Ad Gaurum, deals with the question of how the embryo receives the soul, subject in which he confronts with the Stoic thesis. The entrance or incorporation of the soul into the body, identified with the embryo, takes place from the outside (ἔξωθεν). Porphyry refers to Aristotle (De anima 2.5.417a5-9), when he explains that the soul has no perception in the absence of external objects, as well as fuel can not ignite isolated as it needs external fire. Plotinus’ disciple takes the Aristotelian analogy between perception and inflammation, again, but states that the latter can arise without fire in contact with fuel. The nature that governs the embryo starts moving and becomes soul, adapting itself to the environment, as if tempered by the cold air outside. In his treatise Ad Gaurum (14.4.23-29), Porphyry criticizes this Stoic theory about the “tempering of the embryo”, that it can be put in connection with the embryological view expressed in Elementha Ethica of Hierocles. This testimony, where Chryssipus name is mentioned and not included in editions and translations of Stoic texts (nor in the SVF neither in the recent collection of Boeri-Salles), seems to us that provides relevant elements.  Según la embriología estoica, el embrión es todavía naturaleza, es decir, posee la vida de una planta, no de un animal. El estoico Hierocles señala que el alma “excede” a la naturaleza porque posee dos potencias anímicas, el impulso y la sensación, ausentes en la naturaleza (Elementa Ethica 1.5-35; BS 13.9; LS53B).El embrión, por tanto, como las plantas, carece de sensación, presentación e impulso. En efecto, los estoicos consideran que el embrión carece de impulso, pero su argumento presenta más dificultades en la defensa de que también carece de sensación. La cuestión sobre el modo en que el embrión recibe el alma es abordada por Porfirio en su tratado Ad Gaurum, donde se enfrenta a las tesis estoicas. La entrada o incorporación del alma en el cuerpo, identificado con el embrión, tiene lugar desde el exterior (ἔξωθεν). Porfirio alude a Aristóteles (De anima 2.5.417a5-9), cuando explica que el alma no posee sensación en ausencia de objetos exteriores, lo mismo que un combustible no puede inflamarse aislado, ya que necesita de fuego exterior en acto. El discípulo de Plotino retoma la analogía aristotélica entre la percepción y la inflamación, pero precisa que esta última puede ocasionarse sin que el fuego entre en contacto con el combustible. La naturaleza que gobierna el embrión se pone en movimiento y se transforma en alma, adaptándose al medio ambiente, como si estuviera templada por el aire frío exterior. En su tratado Ad Gaurum (14.4.23-29) Porfirio critica esta teoría estoica del “temple del embrión”, que podemos poner en conexión con las tesis embriológicas expuestas en los Elementha Ethica de Hierocles. Este testimonio, donde se menciona el nombre de Crisipo y que no aparece recogido en las ediciones y traducciones de los textos estoicos (ni en los SVF ni en la reciente recopilación de Boeri-Salles), nos parece que aporta elementos relevantes.  application/pdf https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/3480 10.34096/cf.n64.3480 spa Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/3480/3207 Cuadernos de filosofía; Núm. 64 (2015); 47-59 2362-485X 0590-1901 Soul’s forge: Porphyry’s criticism to the Stoic embryology La fragua del alma: Crítica de Porfirio a la embriología estoica info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=3480_oai