The Nature of Propositions and Propositional Attitudes According to William of Ockham

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Ockham proposed two consecutive theories about the nature of common concepts or universals. In parallel to these two theories, Ockham proposed two theories about the nature of propositions. This article has two interrelated goals. First, to reveal that Ockham's first theory of the nature of pro...

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Autor principal: Gamboa, Lydia Deni
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2025
Materias:
Guillermo de Ockham
Proposiciones
Actitudes proposicionales
Juicios
Aprehensiones
William of Ockham
Propositions
Propositional attitudes
Judgements
Apprehensions
Acceso en línea:https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/14593
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=14593_oai
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spelling I28-R145-14593_oai2025-11-17 Gamboa, Lydia Deni 2025-04-28 Ockham proposed two consecutive theories about the nature of common concepts or universals. In parallel to these two theories, Ockham proposed two theories about the nature of propositions. This article has two interrelated goals. First, to reveal that Ockham's first theory of the nature of propositions solves only two of the three problems that contemporary propositional realism conceives in some of its arguments, while the second theory solves three of those problems. In each case, however, Ockham attributes the same characteristics and functions to propositions as contemporary literature. Secondly, my goal in this article is to reveal that, by observing those characteristics and functions of propositions, it is clear that Ockham's theories about propositions are consistent with a single theory about the nature of judgments, and apprehensions, two different types of propositional attitudes. Ockham propuso dos teorías consecutivas sobre la naturaleza de los conceptos comunes o universales. De manera paralela a estas dos teorías, Ockham propuso dos teorías sobre la naturaleza de las proposiciones. Este artículo tiene dos objetivos vinculados entre sí. En primer lugar, mostrar que la primera teoría de Ockham sobre la naturaleza de las proposiciones resuelve solo dos de los tres problemas que el realismo proposicional contemporáneo concibe en sus argumentos, mientras que la segunda teoría resuelve tres de estos problemas. En cada caso, sin embargo, Ockham atribuye las mismas características y funciones a las proposiciones que la literatura contemporánea. En segundo lugar, en este artículo tengo como objetivo mostrar que, al observar aquellas características y funciones de las proposiciones, es claro que las dos teorías sobre las proposiciones de Ockham son consistentes con una sola teoría sobre la naturaleza de los juicios, y las aprehensiones complejas, dos tipos diferentes de actitudes proposicionales. application/pdf https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/14593 10.34096/petm.v46.n1.14593 spa Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/14593/14724 Patristica et Mediævalia; Vol. 46 Núm. 1 (2025); 21-38 2683-9636 Guillermo de Ockham Proposiciones Actitudes proposicionales Juicios Aprehensiones William of Ockham Propositions Propositional attitudes Judgements Apprehensions The Nature of Propositions and Propositional Attitudes According to William of Ockham La naturaleza de las proposiciones y las actitudes proposicionales según Guillermo de Ockham info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=14593_oai
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-145
collection Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
language Español
orig_language_str_mv spa
topic Guillermo de Ockham
Proposiciones
Actitudes proposicionales
Juicios
Aprehensiones
William of Ockham
Propositions
Propositional attitudes
Judgements
Apprehensions
spellingShingle Guillermo de Ockham
Proposiciones
Actitudes proposicionales
Juicios
Aprehensiones
William of Ockham
Propositions
Propositional attitudes
Judgements
Apprehensions
Gamboa, Lydia Deni
The Nature of Propositions and Propositional Attitudes According to William of Ockham
topic_facet Guillermo de Ockham
Proposiciones
Actitudes proposicionales
Juicios
Aprehensiones
William of Ockham
Propositions
Propositional attitudes
Judgements
Apprehensions
description Ockham proposed two consecutive theories about the nature of common concepts or universals. In parallel to these two theories, Ockham proposed two theories about the nature of propositions. This article has two interrelated goals. First, to reveal that Ockham's first theory of the nature of propositions solves only two of the three problems that contemporary propositional realism conceives in some of its arguments, while the second theory solves three of those problems. In each case, however, Ockham attributes the same characteristics and functions to propositions as contemporary literature. Secondly, my goal in this article is to reveal that, by observing those characteristics and functions of propositions, it is clear that Ockham's theories about propositions are consistent with a single theory about the nature of judgments, and apprehensions, two different types of propositional attitudes.
format Artículo
publishedVersion
author Gamboa, Lydia Deni
author_facet Gamboa, Lydia Deni
author_sort Gamboa, Lydia Deni
title The Nature of Propositions and Propositional Attitudes According to William of Ockham
title_short The Nature of Propositions and Propositional Attitudes According to William of Ockham
title_full The Nature of Propositions and Propositional Attitudes According to William of Ockham
title_fullStr The Nature of Propositions and Propositional Attitudes According to William of Ockham
title_full_unstemmed The Nature of Propositions and Propositional Attitudes According to William of Ockham
title_sort nature of propositions and propositional attitudes according to william of ockham
publisher Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
publishDate 2025
url https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/14593
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=14593_oai
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