Malvinas War. The predominance of the naval chiefs in the military planning of April2
The article focuses on the military planning developed exclusively by navy personnel and its relationship with the process that led to the force’s political decision in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. The first part deals with the work of the admirals subordinate to Anaya, from mid-December 1981 un...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion Articles Artículos Artigos |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/historiayguerra/article/view/11192 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=histogue&d=11192_oai |
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| Sumario: | The article focuses on the military planning developed exclusively by navy personnel and its relationship with the process that led to the force’s political decision in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands.
The first part deals with the work of the admirals subordinate to Anaya, from mid-December 1981 until March 1982, when they presented their task to the members of the Junta.
The second part analyzes the planning involvement in the Junta’s decision and the naval chiefs’ participation in the final modifications before the execution of the landing operation on April 2 1982. |
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