Malvinas War. The predominance of the naval chiefs in the military planning of April2

The article focuses on the military planning developed exclusively by navy personnel and its relationship with the process that led to the force’s political decision in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. The first part deals with the work of the admirals subordinate to Anaya, from mid-December 1981 un...

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Autor principal: Del Ben, Pablo Ariel
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion Articles Artículos Artigos
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2022
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Acceso en línea:https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/historiayguerra/article/view/11192
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=histogue&d=11192_oai
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spelling I28-R145-11192_oai2025-11-17 Del Ben, Pablo Ariel 2022-09-19 The article focuses on the military planning developed exclusively by navy personnel and its relationship with the process that led to the force’s political decision in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. The first part deals with the work of the admirals subordinate to Anaya, from mid-December 1981 until March 1982, when they presented their task to the members of the Junta.  The second part analyzes the planning involvement in the Junta’s decision and the naval chiefs’ participation in the final modifications before the execution of the landing operation on April 2 1982. El artículo centra su análisis en el planeamiento militar desarrollado exclusivamente por personal de la Armada y su relación con el proceso que derivó en la decisión política de tomar por la fuerza las islas Malvinas. La primera parte aborda el trabajo de los almirantes subordinados a Anaya, desde mediados de diciembre de 1981 hasta al mes de marzo del año siguiente, cuando los planificadores expusieron su tarea a los miembros de la Junta gobernante. La segunda parte propone una aproximación a la implicancia del planeamiento en la decisión de la Junta y la participación de los jefes navales en las modificaciones finales ante la ejecución de la operación de desembarco el 2 de abril de 1982     application/pdf text/html https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/historiayguerra/article/view/11192 10.34096/hyg.n2.11192 spa Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/historiayguerra/article/view/11192/10572 https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/historiayguerra/article/view/11192/10586 Derechos de autor 2022 Pablo Ariel Del Ben Historia & Guerra; No. 2 (2022): July-December; 118-136 Historia & Guerra; Núm. 2 (2022): Julio-Diciembre; 118-136 2796-8650 Planeamiento militar Almirantes Junta Desembarco Military planning Admirals Decision Junta Landing Malvinas War. The predominance of the naval chiefs in the military planning of April2 Guerra de Malvinas. El predominio de los jefes navales en el planeamiento militar del 2 de abril info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Articles Artículos Artigos https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=histogue&d=11192_oai
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-145
collection Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
language Español
orig_language_str_mv spa
topic Planeamiento militar
Almirantes
Junta
Desembarco
Military planning
Admirals
Decision
Junta
Landing
spellingShingle Planeamiento militar
Almirantes
Junta
Desembarco
Military planning
Admirals
Decision
Junta
Landing
Del Ben, Pablo Ariel
Malvinas War. The predominance of the naval chiefs in the military planning of April2
topic_facet Planeamiento militar
Almirantes
Junta
Desembarco
Military planning
Admirals
Decision
Junta
Landing
description The article focuses on the military planning developed exclusively by navy personnel and its relationship with the process that led to the force’s political decision in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. The first part deals with the work of the admirals subordinate to Anaya, from mid-December 1981 until March 1982, when they presented their task to the members of the Junta.  The second part analyzes the planning involvement in the Junta’s decision and the naval chiefs’ participation in the final modifications before the execution of the landing operation on April 2 1982.
format Artículo
publishedVersion
Articles
Artículos
Artigos
author Del Ben, Pablo Ariel
author_facet Del Ben, Pablo Ariel
author_sort Del Ben, Pablo Ariel
title Malvinas War. The predominance of the naval chiefs in the military planning of April2
title_short Malvinas War. The predominance of the naval chiefs in the military planning of April2
title_full Malvinas War. The predominance of the naval chiefs in the military planning of April2
title_fullStr Malvinas War. The predominance of the naval chiefs in the military planning of April2
title_full_unstemmed Malvinas War. The predominance of the naval chiefs in the military planning of April2
title_sort malvinas war. the predominance of the naval chiefs in the military planning of april2
publisher Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
publishDate 2022
url https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/historiayguerra/article/view/11192
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=histogue&d=11192_oai
work_keys_str_mv AT delbenpabloariel malvinaswarthepredominanceofthenavalchiefsinthemilitaryplanningofapril2
AT delbenpabloariel guerrademalvinaselpredominiodelosjefesnavalesenelplaneamientomilitardel2deabril
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