Decir que no
To say no is the first step of the conquest of our freedom. It can be thought that it is the decisive, and most difficult step. We can say that this is the negative freedom which has been considered as a minor, or mistaken form of freedom. But in the context of the current disenchantment respect to...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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ARFIL y UNL
2018
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| Acceso en línea: | https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/7429 |
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I26-R133-article-7429 |
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I26-R133-article-74292018-10-22T13:01:11Z Decir que no De Zan, Julio To say no is the first step of the conquest of our freedom. It can be thought that it is the decisive, and most difficult step. We can say that this is the negative freedom which has been considered as a minor, or mistaken form of freedom. But in the context of the current disenchantment respect to the positive freedom of the existing democracies, the negative freedom of the individual rights has been revalued. And opposite to the hegemonic speech of the affirmative culture, which H. Marcusse with great penetration had already denounced, it seems to be opportune to claim the concept of the dialectical negativity of freedom. The intention of this article is to clarify, first of all, the concept of the negative freedom, because this expression has been used at least with two quite different meanings. This essay is developed in the following points: 1) the political concept of the negative freedom in liberalism; 2) the philosophical concept of the negative freedom in Hegel and; 3) finally some projections of these concepts for the political philosophy and for the theory of the revolution are outlined. Decir que no es el primer paso de la conquista de nuestra libertad. Puede considerarse también que es el paso decisivo, y el más difícil. Se habla en este caso de libertad negativa. Esta ha sido considerada a veces como una forma menor, o equivocada de la libertad. Pero en el contexto del actual desencanto frente a la libertad positiva de las democracias existentes, se ha revalorizado la libertad negativa de los derechos individuales. Y frente al discurso hegemónico de la cultura afirmativa, que ya había denunciado H. Marcusse con gran penetración, me parece oportuno reivindicar el concepto de la negatividad dialéctica de la libertad. Es propósito de este artículo aclarar ante todo el concepto de la libertad negativa, porque dicha expresión se ha empleado por lo menos en dos sentidos bien diferentes en la historia del pensamiento. El desarrollo de la exposición recorre los puntos siguientes: 1) el concepto político de la libertad negativa del liberalismo, 2) el concepto filosófico de la libertad negativa en Hegel y, 3) finalmente se esbozan algunas proyecciones de estos conceptos para la filosofía política y la teoría de la revolución. ARFIL y UNL 2018-06-19 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/7429 10.14409/topicos.v0i10.7429 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; Núm. 10 (2002): Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; 137-150 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; No. 10 (2002): Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; 137-150 1668-723X 1666-485X 10.14409/topicos.v0i10 spa https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/7429/10809 Derechos de autor 2018 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe |
| institution |
Universidad Nacional del Litoral |
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I-26 |
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R-133 |
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Biblioteca Virtual - Publicaciones (UNL) |
| language |
Español |
| format |
Artículo revista |
| author |
De Zan, Julio |
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De Zan, Julio Decir que no |
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De Zan, Julio |
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De Zan, Julio |
| title |
Decir que no |
| title_short |
Decir que no |
| title_full |
Decir que no |
| title_fullStr |
Decir que no |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Decir que no |
| title_sort |
decir que no |
| description |
To say no is the first step of the conquest of our freedom. It can be thought that it is the decisive, and most difficult step. We can say that this is the negative freedom which has been considered as a minor, or mistaken form of freedom. But in the context of the current disenchantment respect to the positive freedom of the existing democracies, the negative freedom of the individual rights has been revalued. And opposite to the hegemonic speech of the affirmative culture, which H. Marcusse with great penetration had already denounced, it seems to be opportune to claim the concept of the dialectical negativity of freedom. The intention of this article is to clarify, first of all, the concept of the negative freedom, because this expression has been used at least with two quite different meanings. This essay is developed in the following points: 1) the political concept of the negative freedom in liberalism; 2) the philosophical concept of the negative freedom in Hegel and; 3) finally some projections of these concepts for the political philosophy and for the theory of the revolution are outlined. |
| publisher |
ARFIL y UNL |
| publishDate |
2018 |
| url |
https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/7429 |
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AT dezanjulio decirqueno |
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2023-07-05T23:20:29Z |
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