Psicologismo y normatividad lógica
This paper examines the relationship between psychologism and the normative status of logic. Traditionally, the thesis of the normativity of logic has been used to argue against psychologism. However, contemporary anti-psychologistic positions lead to a purely descriptive characterization of logic t...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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ARFIL y UNL
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/index/article/view/14213 |
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| Sumario: | This paper examines the relationship between psychologism and the normative status of logic. Traditionally, the thesis of the normativity of logic has been used to argue against psychologism. However, contemporary anti-psychologistic positions lead to a purely descriptive characterization of logic that distances it from its purportedly intrinsic normative function. Against this trend, I argue that the defence of logical normativity requires a position akin to psychologism. On the one hand, I show that anti-psychologistic positions cannot adequately account for the connection between logic and reasoning. On the other hand, I argue that a current variant of psychologism, called social psychologism, can account for the connection between logic and the cognitive processes involved in human reasoning and thus vindicate the thesis of logical normativity. My argument considers why this variant of psychologism is preferable to other current proposals offered in this discussion, such as Robert Hanna's (2006) cognitivism. |
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