The Friend as “Another Self” in the Selfishness-Altruism Controversy (Nichomachean Ethics IX 4 and 8).

For several decades, scholars have debated whether the Aristotelian conceptualization of friendship is framed by egoistic or altruistic ethical conceptions. Although the Stagirite holds that the virtuous love and wish the good of their friend "for the sake of the friend himself", and that...

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Autor principal: Tabaki´an, Diego
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Facultad de Humanidades UNCo 2023
Materias:
Friendship
Other selves
Altruism
Egoism
Amistad
Otro sí mismo
Altruismo
Egoismo
Acceso en línea:https://revele.uncoma.edu.ar/index.php/filosofia/article/view/5553
Aporte de:
Repositorio de Revistas Electrónicas REVELE (UNComahue) de Universidad Nacional del Comahue
id I22-R128-article-5553
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institution Universidad Nacional del Comahue
institution_str I-22
repository_str R-128
container_title_str Repositorio de Revistas Electrónicas REVELE (UNComahue)
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Friendship
Other selves
Altruism
Egoism
Amistad
Otro sí mismo
Altruismo
Egoismo
spellingShingle Friendship
Other selves
Altruism
Egoism
Amistad
Otro sí mismo
Altruismo
Egoismo
Tabaki´an, Diego
The Friend as “Another Self” in the Selfishness-Altruism Controversy (Nichomachean Ethics IX 4 and 8).
topic_facet Friendship
Other selves
Altruism
Egoism
Amistad
Otro sí mismo
Altruismo
Egoismo
author Tabaki´an, Diego
author_facet Tabaki´an, Diego
author_sort Tabaki´an, Diego
title The Friend as “Another Self” in the Selfishness-Altruism Controversy (Nichomachean Ethics IX 4 and 8).
title_short The Friend as “Another Self” in the Selfishness-Altruism Controversy (Nichomachean Ethics IX 4 and 8).
title_full The Friend as “Another Self” in the Selfishness-Altruism Controversy (Nichomachean Ethics IX 4 and 8).
title_fullStr The Friend as “Another Self” in the Selfishness-Altruism Controversy (Nichomachean Ethics IX 4 and 8).
title_full_unstemmed The Friend as “Another Self” in the Selfishness-Altruism Controversy (Nichomachean Ethics IX 4 and 8).
title_sort friend as “another self” in the selfishness-altruism controversy (nichomachean ethics ix 4 and 8).
description For several decades, scholars have debated whether the Aristotelian conceptualization of friendship is framed by egoistic or altruistic ethical conceptions. Although the Stagirite holds that the virtuous love and wish the good of their friend "for the sake of the friend himself", and that they are capable of altruistic acts such as sacrificing themselves for their neighbor, he also makes claims consistent with egoism, namely, that friendly relations and the marks of friendship originate and are eminently found in the relationship that the good man maintains with himself, that love for friends proceeds from love for oneself, that everyone is the best friend of himself, and that we should love, first and foremost, ourselves. In this paper, I propose to analyze the passages that have given rise to the polemic in question (IX. 4 and 8) by focusing on the argumentative function played by the premise of the friend as "other self." Since both altruistic and egoistic readings presuppose this premise, an examination of the most relevant interpretations of the friend as "other self" is essential. In short, whether one defends an egoistic or an altruistic conception of virtuous friendship, the crux of the debate is to clarify the Aristotelian conceptualization of the friend as "other self" and the role played by friends in eudaimonia. Here I argue for an "analogical" reading of the friend as "other-self," according to which love for the friend is analogous and irreducible to self-love, which is compatible with the recognition that friendship has as a condition of possibility, the love of the noble self.
publisher Facultad de Humanidades UNCo
publishDate 2023
url https://revele.uncoma.edu.ar/index.php/filosofia/article/view/5553
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spelling I22-R128-article-55532024-12-03T17:20:38Z The Friend as “Another Self” in the Selfishness-Altruism Controversy (Nichomachean Ethics IX 4 and 8). El amigo en tanto “otro sí mismo” en la polémica egoísmo-altruismo (Ética Nicomáquea IX 4 y 8). Tabaki´an, Diego Friendship Other selves Altruism Egoism Amistad Otro sí mismo Altruismo Egoismo For several decades, scholars have debated whether the Aristotelian conceptualization of friendship is framed by egoistic or altruistic ethical conceptions. Although the Stagirite holds that the virtuous love and wish the good of their friend "for the sake of the friend himself", and that they are capable of altruistic acts such as sacrificing themselves for their neighbor, he also makes claims consistent with egoism, namely, that friendly relations and the marks of friendship originate and are eminently found in the relationship that the good man maintains with himself, that love for friends proceeds from love for oneself, that everyone is the best friend of himself, and that we should love, first and foremost, ourselves. In this paper, I propose to analyze the passages that have given rise to the polemic in question (IX. 4 and 8) by focusing on the argumentative function played by the premise of the friend as "other self." Since both altruistic and egoistic readings presuppose this premise, an examination of the most relevant interpretations of the friend as "other self" is essential. In short, whether one defends an egoistic or an altruistic conception of virtuous friendship, the crux of the debate is to clarify the Aristotelian conceptualization of the friend as "other self" and the role played by friends in eudaimonia. Here I argue for an "analogical" reading of the friend as "other-self," according to which love for the friend is analogous and irreducible to self-love, which is compatible with the recognition that friendship has as a condition of possibility, the love of the noble self. Desde hace varias décadas, los estudiosos debaten si la conceptualización aristotélica de la amistad se enmarca en concepciones éticas egoístas o altruistas. Aunque el Estagirita sostiene que los virtuosos aman y desean el bien de su amigo “por el amigo mismo” y que son capaces de actos altruistas como sacrificarse por el prójimo, también realiza afirmaciones consistentes con el egoísmo, a saber, que las relaciones amistosas y las marcas de la amistad se originan y se encuentran eminentemente en la relación que el hombre bueno mantiene consigo mismo, que el amor hacia los amigos procede del amor por uno mismo, que cada uno es el mejor amigo de sí mismo, y que debemos amarnos, ante todo, a nosotros mismos. En este trabajo, me propongo analizar los pasajes que han suscitado la polémica en cuestión (IX. 4 y 8) focalizando en la función argumentativa que desempeña la premisa del amigo en tanto “otro sí mismo”. Puesto que tanto las lecturas altruistas como egoístas presuponen esta premisa, es imprescindible realizar un examen de las interpretaciones más relevantes del amigo en tanto “otro yo”. En suma, ya sea que se defienda una concepción egoísta o altruista de la amistad virtuosa, el eje del debate pasa por esclarecer la conceptualización aristotélica del amigo en tanto “otro sí mismo” y el papel desempeñado por los amigos en la eudaimonía. Aquí sostengo una lectura “analógica” del amigo en tanto “otro sí mismo”, de acuerdo con la cual el amor por el amigo es análogo e irreductible al amor propio, lo cual es compatible con reconocer que la amistad tiene por condición de posibilidad el amor de sí mismo. Facultad de Humanidades UNCo 2023-12-12 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Artículo evaluado por pares application/pdf text/html https://revele.uncoma.edu.ar/index.php/filosofia/article/view/5553 ark:/s18537960/5ra72aefh Páginas de Filosofía; Vol. 24 No. 27 (2023); 146-168 Páginas de Filosofía; Vol. 24 Núm. 27 (2023); 146-168 1853-7960 0327-5108 spa https://revele.uncoma.edu.ar/index.php/filosofia/article/view/5553/62456 https://revele.uncoma.edu.ar/index.php/filosofia/article/view/5553/62521 Derechos de autor 2024 Páginas de Filosofía https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

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