Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission

In this paper we extend Lizzeri’s simple model of information transmission through certification intermediaries. A seller with no means to signal his quality has the possibility to be certified by an institution that owns a technology to discover the true quality and can credibly commit to a disclos...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Quesada, Lucía, Peryache, Eloïc
Formato:	Objeto de conferencia
Lenguaje:	Inglés
Publicado:	2002
Materias:	Ciencias Económicas Intermediary, Certification, Information Transmission, Quality. monopolio JEL: D42, D82, L15
Acceso en línea:	http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/57140 http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/semi/semi190702.pdf
Aporte de:	SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata

id	I19-R120-10915-57140
record_format	dspace
institution	Universidad Nacional de La Plata
institution_str	I-19
repository_str	R-120
collection	SEDICI (UNLP)
language	Inglés
topic	Ciencias Económicas Intermediary, Certification, Information Transmission, Quality. monopolio JEL: D42, D82, L15
spellingShingle	Ciencias Económicas Intermediary, Certification, Information Transmission, Quality. monopolio JEL: D42, D82, L15 Quesada, Lucía Peryache, Eloïc Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission
topic_facet	Ciencias Económicas Intermediary, Certification, Information Transmission, Quality. monopolio JEL: D42, D82, L15
description	In this paper we extend Lizzeri’s simple model of information transmission through certification intermediaries. A seller with no means to signal his quality has the possibility to be certified by an institution that owns a technology to discover the true quality and can credibly commit to a disclosure rule. We study the incentives of this institution to disclose information to the buyers. When buyers are risk neutral, the intermediary cannot help to increase the total surplus and, therefore, there is no disclosure of information at equilibrium. Moreover, there always exists an equilibrium with no revelation of information. However, with an unrestricted space of contracts, self selection of sellers indirectly transmits some information. On the other hand, when buyers are risk averse, the intermediary can increase total surplus by inducing better risk sharing. We show that the equilibrium is to offer a menu of contracts where information will be fully disclosed for all types above a certain threshold and no announcement is made for the others.
format	Objeto de conferencia Objeto de conferencia
author	Quesada, Lucía Peryache, Eloïc
author_facet	Quesada, Lucía Peryache, Eloïc
author_sort	Quesada, Lucía
title	Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission
title_short	Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission
title_full	Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission
title_fullStr	Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission
title_full_unstemmed	Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission
title_sort	monopoly intermediary and information transmission
publishDate	2002
url	http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/57140 http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/semi/semi190702.pdf
work_keys_str_mv	AT quesadalucia monopolyintermediaryandinformationtransmission AT peryacheeloic monopolyintermediaryandinformationtransmission
bdutipo_str	Repositorios
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Monopoly Intermediary and Information Transmission

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