Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
In contrast to previous empirical work on electoral cycles, which implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy, this paper contends that under separation of powers an unaligned legislature may have a moderating role. Focusing on the budget surplus, we find that stronger ef...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | Streb, Jorge Miguel, Lema, Daniel, Torrens, Gustavo |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Objeto de conferencia |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
2005
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3816 http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/jemi/2005/trabajo11.pdf |
| Aporte de: |
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