Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers

In contrast to previous empirical work on electoral cycles, which implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy, this paper contends that under separation of powers an unaligned legislature may have a moderating role. Focusing on the budget surplus, we find that stronger ef...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Streb, Jorge Miguel, Lema, Daniel, Torrens, Gustavo
Formato: Objeto de conferencia
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2005
Materias:
Ciencias Económicas
political budget cycles; asymmetric information; discretion; separation of powers; checks and balances; veto players; rule of law
Economía
presupuesto
Recursos presupuestarios
Política económica
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3816
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/jemi/2005/trabajo11.pdf
Aporte de:
SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata
id I19-R120-10915-3816
record_format dspace
institution Universidad Nacional de La Plata
institution_str I-19
repository_str R-120
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
language Inglés
topic Ciencias Económicas
political budget cycles; asymmetric information; discretion; separation of powers; checks and balances; veto players; rule of law
Economía
presupuesto
Recursos presupuestarios
Política económica
spellingShingle Ciencias Económicas
political budget cycles; asymmetric information; discretion; separation of powers; checks and balances; veto players; rule of law
Economía
presupuesto
Recursos presupuestarios
Política económica
Streb, Jorge Miguel
Lema, Daniel
Torrens, Gustavo
Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
topic_facet Ciencias Económicas
political budget cycles; asymmetric information; discretion; separation of powers; checks and balances; veto players; rule of law
Economía
presupuesto
Recursos presupuestarios
Política económica
description In contrast to previous empirical work on electoral cycles, which implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy, this paper contends that under separation of powers an unaligned legislature may have a moderating role. Focusing on the budget surplus, we find that stronger effective checks and balances explain why cycles are weaker in developed and established democracies. Once the discretional component of executive power is isolated, there are significant cycles in all democracies. Whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary, or the electoral rules are majoritarian or proportional, does not change the basic results.
format Objeto de conferencia
Objeto de conferencia
author Streb, Jorge Miguel
Lema, Daniel
Torrens, Gustavo
author_facet Streb, Jorge Miguel
Lema, Daniel
Torrens, Gustavo
author_sort Streb, Jorge Miguel
title Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
title_short Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
title_full Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
title_fullStr Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
title_full_unstemmed Discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
title_sort discretional political budget cycles and separation of powers
publishDate 2005
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/3816
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/jemi/2005/trabajo11.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT strebjorgemiguel discretionalpoliticalbudgetcyclesandseparationofpowers
AT lemadaniel discretionalpoliticalbudgetcyclesandseparationofpowers
AT torrensgustavo discretionalpoliticalbudgetcyclesandseparationofpowers
bdutipo_str Repositorios
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