Managing strategic buyers: should a seller ban resale?

We study the seller’s pricing strategy of one good (finite inventory) that can be sold in two bargaining periods (before a deadline) when she faces two strategic buyers with private valuations. In particular, we are interested in comparing the outcomes of this game in two environments: allowing vers...

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Autores principales: Beccuti, Juan, Coleff, Joaquin
Formato: Objeto de conferencia
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2016
Materias:
Ciencias Económicas
resale
bargaining
price discrimination
strategic buyers
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/170440
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SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata
id I19-R120-10915-170440
record_format dspace
spelling I19-R120-10915-1704402024-09-20T20:44:05Z http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/170440 Managing strategic buyers: should a seller ban resale? Beccuti, Juan Coleff, Joaquin 2016-11 2016 2024-09-20T16:04:16Z en Ciencias Económicas resale bargaining price discrimination strategic buyers We study the seller’s pricing strategy of one good (finite inventory) that can be sold in two bargaining periods (before a deadline) when she faces two strategic buyers with private valuations. In particular, we are interested in comparing the outcomes of this game in two environments: allowing versus forbidding a resale option. Without resale, the seller charges prices high in the first bargaining period to motivate high valuation consumers to buy, but prices are reduced if no buyer expresses their willingness to buy. Compared with this benchmark case, introducing the resale option generates two effects: there is an increase in consumers willingness to buy in the first period, motivating an increase in the price of the first period, but there is an increase in demand price-elasticity of the first period, motivating a decrease in the price of the first period. We show that the second effect dominates for a bunch of reasonable parameters, motivating a reduction in first period price and generating an increase in profits, aggregate consumer surplus, and, thus, in welfare Facultad de Ciencias Económicas Objeto de conferencia Objeto de conferencia http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) application/pdf
institution Universidad Nacional de La Plata
institution_str I-19
repository_str R-120
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
language Inglés
topic Ciencias Económicas
resale
bargaining
price discrimination
strategic buyers
spellingShingle Ciencias Económicas
resale
bargaining
price discrimination
strategic buyers
Beccuti, Juan
Coleff, Joaquin
Managing strategic buyers: should a seller ban resale?
topic_facet Ciencias Económicas
resale
bargaining
price discrimination
strategic buyers
description We study the seller’s pricing strategy of one good (finite inventory) that can be sold in two bargaining periods (before a deadline) when she faces two strategic buyers with private valuations. In particular, we are interested in comparing the outcomes of this game in two environments: allowing versus forbidding a resale option. Without resale, the seller charges prices high in the first bargaining period to motivate high valuation consumers to buy, but prices are reduced if no buyer expresses their willingness to buy. Compared with this benchmark case, introducing the resale option generates two effects: there is an increase in consumers willingness to buy in the first period, motivating an increase in the price of the first period, but there is an increase in demand price-elasticity of the first period, motivating a decrease in the price of the first period. We show that the second effect dominates for a bunch of reasonable parameters, motivating a reduction in first period price and generating an increase in profits, aggregate consumer surplus, and, thus, in welfare
format Objeto de conferencia
Objeto de conferencia
author Beccuti, Juan
Coleff, Joaquin
author_facet Beccuti, Juan
Coleff, Joaquin
author_sort Beccuti, Juan
title Managing strategic buyers: should a seller ban resale?
title_short Managing strategic buyers: should a seller ban resale?
title_full Managing strategic buyers: should a seller ban resale?
title_fullStr Managing strategic buyers: should a seller ban resale?
title_full_unstemmed Managing strategic buyers: should a seller ban resale?
title_sort managing strategic buyers: should a seller ban resale?
publishDate 2016
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/170440
work_keys_str_mv AT beccutijuan managingstrategicbuyersshouldasellerbanresale
AT coleffjoaquin managingstrategicbuyersshouldasellerbanresale
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