Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina

This paper explores the relationship between political influence actions and benefits obtained from public procurement. We develop a theoretical model of electoral competition where interest groups can engage in both ex-ante campaign contributions and ex-post lobbying contributions. We derive the op...

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Autores principales: Freille, Sebastián, Avramovich, Cecilia, Moncarz, Pedro, Soffietti, Pablo
Formato: Objeto de conferencia
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2018
Materias:
Ciencias Económicas
Political Investments
Campaign finance
Lobbying Audiences
Public Procurement
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/169122
Aporte de:
SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata
id I19-R120-10915-169122
record_format dspace
spelling I19-R120-10915-1691222024-09-02T20:02:03Z http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/169122 Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina Freille, Sebastián Avramovich, Cecilia Moncarz, Pedro Soffietti, Pablo 2018-11 2018 2024-08-27T13:48:10Z en Ciencias Económicas Political Investments Campaign finance Lobbying Audiences Public Procurement This paper explores the relationship between political influence actions and benefits obtained from public procurement. We develop a theoretical model of electoral competition where interest groups can engage in both ex-ante campaign contributions and ex-post lobbying contributions. We derive the optimal distribution of ex-ante and ex-post contributions by interest groups to candidates. If the preference of the interest groups are aligned, political contributions to both candidates are increasing in their respective announced expenditures. Ex-ante and ex-post contributions are imperfect substitutes and the higher the announced expenditure, the more biased the distribution is towards (ex-post) lobbying. Using previously unavailable individual-level data, we test empirically the predictions of the model and to model the probability of obtaining a public contract as a function of both ex-ante and ex-post efforts by interest groups. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas Objeto de conferencia Objeto de conferencia http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) application/pdf
institution Universidad Nacional de La Plata
institution_str I-19
repository_str R-120
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
language Inglés
topic Ciencias Económicas
Political Investments
Campaign finance
Lobbying Audiences
Public Procurement
spellingShingle Ciencias Económicas
Political Investments
Campaign finance
Lobbying Audiences
Public Procurement
Freille, Sebastián
Avramovich, Cecilia
Moncarz, Pedro
Soffietti, Pablo
Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
topic_facet Ciencias Económicas
Political Investments
Campaign finance
Lobbying Audiences
Public Procurement
description This paper explores the relationship between political influence actions and benefits obtained from public procurement. We develop a theoretical model of electoral competition where interest groups can engage in both ex-ante campaign contributions and ex-post lobbying contributions. We derive the optimal distribution of ex-ante and ex-post contributions by interest groups to candidates. If the preference of the interest groups are aligned, political contributions to both candidates are increasing in their respective announced expenditures. Ex-ante and ex-post contributions are imperfect substitutes and the higher the announced expenditure, the more biased the distribution is towards (ex-post) lobbying. Using previously unavailable individual-level data, we test empirically the predictions of the model and to model the probability of obtaining a public contract as a function of both ex-ante and ex-post efforts by interest groups.
format Objeto de conferencia
Objeto de conferencia
author Freille, Sebastián
Avramovich, Cecilia
Moncarz, Pedro
Soffietti, Pablo
author_facet Freille, Sebastián
Avramovich, Cecilia
Moncarz, Pedro
Soffietti, Pablo
author_sort Freille, Sebastián
title Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
title_short Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
title_full Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
title_fullStr Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
title_full_unstemmed Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : An investigation for Argentina
title_sort inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts : an investigation for argentina
publishDate 2018
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/169122
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AT moncarzpedro insidetherevolvingdoorcampaignfinancelobbyingmeetingsandpubliccontractsaninvestigationforargentina
AT soffiettipablo insidetherevolvingdoorcampaignfinancelobbyingmeetingsandpubliccontractsaninvestigationforargentina
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