The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation

The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that Kant has propounded an internalist theory of moral motivation. In particular, I shall argue that Kant's espousal of internalism is evidenced by his claim that pure reason's relation to the will is premised on a practical synthetic a prio...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Triantafyllos Gkouvas
Formato: Artículo científico
Publicado: Universidad del Norte 2011
Materias:
Filosofía
Moral motivation
moral judgment
pure reason
will
autonomy
Acceso en línea:http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=85422476007
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=co/co-015&d=85422476007oai
Aporte de:
Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) de Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
id I16-R122-85422476007oai
record_format dspace
institution Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
institution_str I-16
repository_str R-122
collection Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)
topic Filosofía
Moral motivation
moral judgment
pure reason
will
autonomy
spellingShingle Filosofía
Moral motivation
moral judgment
pure reason
will
autonomy
Triantafyllos Gkouvas
The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation
topic_facet Filosofía
Moral motivation
moral judgment
pure reason
will
autonomy
description The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that Kant has propounded an internalist theory of moral motivation. In particular, I shall argue that Kant's espousal of internalism is evidenced by his claim that pure reason's relation to the will is premised on a practical synthetic a priori proposition. What I aim to demonstrate is that Kant treated practical syntheticity as a pivotal concept for his account of what it means to be motivated by principles of pure reason. On my construal of Kant's motivational theory, the relation between universalizable maxims and the moral interest to act upon them is necessary but non-tautological, since violations of duty are logically possible despite our having a moral reason to act. What prevents the latter argument from collapsing into a quasiexternalist account of moral motivation is that the motivational impact of law-like maxims is ultimately premised on a normative conception of ourselves as free agents.
format Artículo científico
Artículo científico
author Triantafyllos Gkouvas
author_facet Triantafyllos Gkouvas
author_sort Triantafyllos Gkouvas
title The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation
title_short The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation
title_full The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation
title_fullStr The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation
title_full_unstemmed The practicality of pure reason. A normative defence of Kant's theory of moral motivation
title_sort practicality of pure reason. a normative defence of kant's theory of moral motivation
publisher Universidad del Norte
publishDate 2011
url http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=85422476007
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=co/co-015&d=85422476007oai
work_keys_str_mv AT triantafyllosgkouvas thepracticalityofpurereasonanormativedefenceofkantstheoryofmoralmotivation
AT triantafyllosgkouvas practicalityofpurereasonanormativedefenceofkantstheoryofmoralmotivation
bdutipo_str Repositorios
_version_ 1764820427034591237

Ejemplares similares