Consciousness and the introspection of "qualitative simples"

Philosophers have long been familiar with the contrast between predicates or concepts that denote qualitative simples, as opposed to predicates or concepts that denote or express structural, relational, causal, or functional features. The tendency has been to think of these two classes of proper...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Paul M. Churchland
Formato:	Artículo científico
Publicado:	Universidad del Norte 2011
Materias:	Filosofía Consciousness introspection qualitative simples features qualitative structural features philosophy of science history of science analytical philosophy
Acceso en línea:	http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=85420750003 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=co/co-015&d=85420750003oai
Aporte de:	Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) de Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales

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institution	Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
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collection	Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)
topic	Filosofía Consciousness introspection qualitative simples features qualitative structural features philosophy of science history of science analytical philosophy
spellingShingle	Filosofía Consciousness introspection qualitative simples features qualitative structural features philosophy of science history of science analytical philosophy Paul M. Churchland Consciousness and the introspection of "qualitative simples"
topic_facet	Filosofía Consciousness introspection qualitative simples features qualitative structural features philosophy of science history of science analytical philosophy
description	Philosophers have long been familiar with the contrast between predicates or concepts that denote qualitative simples, as opposed to predicates or concepts that denote or express structural, relational, causal, or functional features. The tendency has been to think of these two classes of properties as being ontologically quite different from each other. Some would insist that the features displayed in this private cognitive domain are the only genuinely simple qualitative features, on grounds that their external brethren all turn out to admit of a structural, relational, causal, or functional analysis of some kind after all. In this paper I wish to take a more general and more philosophical approach to the anti-reductionist arguments which run into trouble with the philosophy of science, with emerging neuroscience, and with the history of science generally. They lack integrity even by the standards of purely analytic philosophy.
format	Artículo científico Artículo científico
author	Paul M. Churchland
author_facet	Paul M. Churchland
author_sort	Paul M. Churchland
title	Consciousness and the introspection of "qualitative simples"
title_short	Consciousness and the introspection of "qualitative simples"
title_full	Consciousness and the introspection of "qualitative simples"
title_fullStr	Consciousness and the introspection of "qualitative simples"
title_full_unstemmed	Consciousness and the introspection of "qualitative simples"
title_sort	consciousness and the introspection of "qualitative simples"
publisher	Universidad del Norte
publishDate	2011
url	http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=85420750003 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=co/co-015&d=85420750003oai
work_keys_str_mv	AT paulmchurchland consciousnessandtheintrospectionofqualitativesimples
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Consciousness and the introspection of "qualitative simples"

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