Electoral competition, tax design and the tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency

This paper analyzes a political economy model of taxation in which political parties design the provision of a public good and the structure of a commodity tax system to maximize votes in the election. In this economy the individuals vote choice is determined by parties policies and voters partisan...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Ikuko Kochi, Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez
Formato: Artículo científico
Publicado: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Unidad Azcapotzalco 2012
Materias:
Economía y Finanzas
Efficiency
redistribution
public goods
elections
Acceso en línea:http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=41324545007
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=mx/mx-022&d=41324545007oai
Aporte de:
Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) de Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales

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